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Timeline of Significant Legislations and Immigration Epochs
United States
1607:
1607-1820s:
1618:
1776:
1790:

1807:
1840s-70s:
1882:
1891:
1880s-1920s:
1920:
1924:

1965:

1965-present:
1981:

Colonial settlement of North America begins
First wave of immigration (~1 million immigrants)
Importation of African slaves begins
Independence from Britain, creation of the American nation
First American immigration policies give naturalized citizenship to "free
white persons
Slave trade declared illegal
Second wave of immigration (~ 15 million immigrants)
Chinese Exclusion Act passed
Immigration Act tightens US borders and immigration regulations
Third wave of immigration (~25 million immigrants, mostly from
Southern and Eastern Europe)
Nebraska is first state to adopt English as the sole official language
National quota system established, severely limiting numbers of
immigrants and establishing official order of preference for certain
nationalities over others
National quota system abolished, Immigration Reform Act passed
eliminating race and ethnicity as admission criteria and giving preference
to family reunification and occupational skills.
Mass immigration of people mostly from Asia and Latin America
English Only movement begins on a national level

Canada
1760:
British conquest of Quebec
1770s-mid 1800s: Influx of "pauper immigration" from Britain, especially Ireland
1869:
Canada's first Immigration Act, with limited restriction on entry
_1876:
Formation of the federal Dominion of Canada (Conferederation)
1885:
Immigration policy requires head tax on Chinese entry
1892:
Responsibilities for immigration transferred from Department of
Agriculture to Department of the Interior
1906, 1910:
Amendments to the Immigration Act allow for more selectivity, used to
limit the volume of "undesirable" racial/ethnic groups such as Asians
1896-1914:
3 million immigrants come to Canada, many to developing urban centers
1919:
Immigration Act excluded aliens from enemy countries-immigrants from
countries with which Canada had been at war (repealed in 1922)
1923:
Chinese excluded from immigration policies
1947:
Chinese exclusion repealed
1952:
Immigration Act lifts some earlier restrictions but still gave preference to
immigrants from Northern Europe and the US
1962:
Elimination of most admissions policies which explicitly discriminated on
basis of race or country of origin. Increasing emphasis on skills, education
and training, but still more difficult for some non-whites to immigrate.
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1976:
1988:

Immigration Act passed stating "admission to Canada should not be based
on 'race, nationality or ethnic origin, colour, religion or sex.'"
Multiculturalism Act

Chapter 1
Introduction
Both Canada and the United States have been referred to by the phrase "nation of
immigrants." The use of this phrase is an attempt to differentiate these two nations from the
older "traditional" nations of Europe, in which participation in the country was based on ethnic
heritage, and citizenship was bestowed by birth. As B~nedict Anderson notes, nations are
modern phenomena; the kind of collective imagination required for all the citizens of a bounded
geographic region to feel some sort of bond with each other is made possible by modernity.
Instead of vertical ties from citizens to the dynastic leader or god of a large realm, widespread
and heterogeneous populations need something else to unify them. Modern nations are formed
and maintained by the creation of an "imagined community," bound together by collective ties of
emotion and memory that take shape in stories they tell about themselves. The narratives help to
define the national community and to differentiate it from others. In the cases of Canada and the
United States, the "insider" and "outsider" groups are far less clear, a result of their national
origins as settler colonies as well as their high levels of immigration since their founding.
But as many academics before me have noted, the term "immigrant" does not always
apply to the early histories of these nations. "Immigrants" as we think of them come to an
already established country (not a territory), different from that of their birth for work, political
refuge, family unification, or sometimes for education. Neither the early settlers to the British
and French trading posts nor the excess workers from those countries that followed fit that
category. The British settlers of the American colonies and their slaves do not fit either. While
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each country undeniably has a strong history of immigration that followed the formative years,
this fact is notable because immigration intertwines with the origin populations and the creation
of a national identity based on these multiple populations. What links the two, and causes these
tangles of national identity, of immigration policy and opinion, of how we view the languages
spoken by residents and how the three factors entwine, is that both of these nations were created
by newcomers. Both of them-their economies, their industries, infrastructure, and finally their
national identities-were built on the backs of the foreign-born population and their descendents
and slaves in the US , who might be called "unwilling immigrants." After a few generations,
each country had a stock population of native-born, but the foreign born, those differentiated
from the rest of the population by birth, continued to be a defining presence. As a result, the
nations as they exist now are exceedingly diverse, and so a unifying nationalism is more difficult
to maintain.
In recent decades, a new concept has emerged in an attempt to comprehend this diversity
in both nations within the concept of a larger community: multiculturalism. "Multicultural" has
become a term used to increase political currency, as claiming any sort of "multicultural agenda"
tends to be an automatically good and legitimate action. The term is easily thrown around, but
infrequently defined. This has not stopped it from being used in many important political
movements and laws, such as Canada's. Taken literally, the word "multicultural" simply means
"several cultures." The Oxford English Dictionary gives the definition "Of or relating to a
society consisting of a number of cultural groups, especially in which the distinctive cultural
identity of each group is maintained." In the cases of the United States and Canada, this phrase
has come to mean the efforts of the state in maintaining a cohesive society amid many different
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cultural components. 1 This is no easy task, though the phrase "multicultural society" comes so
easily to our tongues. With respect to American and Canadian nationalisms, it has meant the
sometimes centuries-long search for a national identity that can accommodate this variety in
population. The alternative, when there are so many different cultural groups, is to attempt to
subsume the "other" groups into one dominant one, to force assimilation, or to reject the nondominant groups. The tactics taken by Canada and the United States to attempt to create stable
societies with binding national identities given this difficult situation are different, and reflect
their different histories, but they display certain similarities as well. Particularly, what they have
in common is a tendency towards fluidity in the way that their nationalisms incorporate, utilize,
or occasionally sidestep, the diversity of their populations.
In the present day, one of the areas in which we can plainly see the continued awareness

,..

of these questions about multiculturalism and nationhood is in the battles over language. Both
Canada and the United States have well-publicized debates over their official and unofficial
languages. In Canada, French speakers and English speakers continue to fight over the place that
the two languages hold in their national character. Canada is an officially bilingual nation,
which means that two languages have official status and recognition. The continued tension over
the use of the two languages-particularly the attitudes of each linguistic group about the
other-demonstrate that simply being an officially bilingual country does not automatically
insure full recognition, respect, and understanding of difference that one would desire in a
multicultural nation. Nor do any of the immigrant languages in Canada have official status,
despite the fact that nearly one-fifth of the Canadian population is foreign-born. By contrast, the
United States does not have an official language, although it has a plethora of languages spoken
within its borders, and a particularly sizable number of Spanish-speakers resulting from recent
1

In this thesis, the terms "multiculturalism" and "pluralism" will be used synonymously.
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immigration trends. But there is a recent movement to make English the one official language,
and the contention surrounding this issue and its meaning for the unity of the US demonstrate
very strong feelings about the definition of the nation with respect to language. As both the
national debates about immigration and the national language projects relate to the interplay
between multiculturalism or pluralism and national identity, language policy can provide an
index into feelings about immigration and the nation.
This thesis will examine the ways in which the national character of these two countries
interacts with their histories of immigration and settlement. It will also examine the histories of
language policy and debate in the two countries. I consider histories of immigration,
nationalism, and language policy for each country, beginning with the United States and then
Canada, and then examine the interaction between these factors within each nation. Finally, I
compare and contrast the experiences of the US and Canada, examining their similarities and
differences with respect to their experiences of the interplay between immigration, nationalism,
and language. Benedict Anderson's concept of the nation relies on the idea of collective
imagination as a way to feel connected to an entire body of people when an individual will never
meet most of them. Canada and the United States provide a fascinating case study in the
difficulties and intricacies of this process of imagining in nations with so many newcomers that
the collective imagination is unsure of its boundaries.

Chapter 2: The United States
Immigration History
Immigration to the United States, while it has been discussed and evoked as a unitary
phenomenon, is actually a long, complicated, and mixed relationship of America to those
entering it. The character, occupations, and origins of these immigrants varied greatly, as did the
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ideas about their purpose and function once they arrived. America is notable not only for the
numbers but for the diversity of its imniigrants.2 But even this fact must be historicized before
we can understand it. As John Higham notes, the term "immigrant" was only given meaning in
the late 18th century. Prior to that time, the relevant category was "emigrant." Newcomers had
been associated with their previous nationality, not their current country of residence. It was not
until the 1780s and later that Americans began to take note of "immigrants" as bearers of foreign
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(non-British) culture, where before they had only been aware of "settlers" who created the
culture of America. 3 After this point, immigrants were seen as a significant group, and though
this group changed in many ways-number, origin, visibility-it was thereafter an important
facet of America's view of itself.
John Isbister divides immigration into the United States into four "waves" (although he
also acknowledges the misleading implication of some kind of constancy associated with that
term). The first, from 1607 to the 1820s, brought around 1 million immigrants, mainly English
and other European settlers. African slaves began to be imported in 1618, and importation
ceased in 1807 when congress declared the slave trade illegal. This first group illustrates the
important differentiations necessary for the groups of people arriving on American shores: the
settler generations established the early years of the nation without identifying as "American."
As the population grew and changed, with newcomers arriving from non-British European
countries such as Germany, the American population became distinctly different from the Anglo

2

John Higham, Send These To Me: Jews and Other Immigrants in Urban America (New York: Atheneum,
1975), 14-16.
3
Ibid, 5-6.
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origins. Arthur Mann notes that this fact was used to argue for independence from the British
parent country .4
After the revolution, there was official national membership that could be attained, and
the new nation's first naturalization law in I 790 gave naturalized citizenship to ."free white
persons." It was implied that "white" meant "fit for self-governance."5 Under this law, the
second, much larger wave, was enabled, and 15 million newcomers traveled to the United States.
From the 1840s to the 1870s, immigrants came in ever-increasing numbers. This "group" was
dominated by Irish and German nationals. At the same time, other "newcomers" were Mexicans
of the southwest, conquered in the Mexican War of 1848, and .Chinese laborers coming to
California. 6 The racial and national boundaries during this period were undergoing shifts and
becoming related in different ways. Through the late 18th and 19th centuries, groups of Jews,
Irish, Armenians, Italians, Poles, Syrians, Greeks, Rumanians, Sicilians, Finns, and others came
to the United States as "free white persons" under the naturalization laws, although they were
still differentiated from the Anglo-Saxon "old stock." Non-whites were still further away, but
these European immigrants were something along the lines of "non-white whites," who
eventually became ''Caucasians" over time.7
Throughout these first two periods, there were no official restrictions on immigration; the
United States maintained an "open door" policy. As Higham points out, during the late I 8th
century, the influx of immigrants was a support for the new Americans in their effort to
differentiate themselves from their (still primarily) British origins. "When a nation of

4

Arthur Mann, The One and the Many: Reflections on the American Identity (Chfrago: University of Chicago
Press, 1979), 46.
5
Matthew Frye Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 7.
6
John Isbister, The Immigration Debate: Remaking America (Connecticut: Kumarian Press, 1996), 32-3.
7
Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color, 7-8.
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immigrants shook off British rule, the very heterogeneity of the American people supplied their
claim to a distinctive national character." In addition, this ideology of the new nation, in which
"American" was a kind of universal nationality, defined America as a place of asylum for other
nationalities. It also argued that one was not bound to a nationality by birth, denying the
previously popular doctrine of perpetual allegiance. 8 Of course, the actuality differed from these
high-minded ideals, which were borne.of a white Protestant northern European culture and thus
assumed its own superiority. Behind the idea of the universal nationality was the assumption of
certain Anglo characteristics. 9
In other ways during the 18th and 19th centuries, the circumstances of the new nation
allowed for unnoticed disparities between these enlightened ideologies and the actual culture of
America. A substantial need for labor, along with strong faith in the power of American
assimilation and a lesser need for national solidarity due to the then-American values of
individualism and isolationism, allowed immigration without considerable opposition.
Particularly after the Civil War, the country was in the process of transitioning from an agrarian
society to an industrial urban colossus. The expanding economy meant that factories were
starving for cheap labor that could be filled by the influx of foreigners. With only two notable
exceptions-the banning of the African slave trade in 1807, and the 1864-68 stimulation for
labor purposes10-immigration was neither helped nor hindered by national American laws
(although there was some influence from individual states). 11
The third wave of American immigration, from the 1880s to the 1920s, brought 25
million immigrants to the United States. A majority came from southern and eastern Europe:
8

Higham, Send These To Me, 31.
Ibid, 31-2.
1
From 1865 to 1868, Congress passed a statute allowing employers to pay for passage of prospective
migrants in exchange for a contract for their service, in an attempt to stimulate immigration. Ibid, 33.
11
Ibid, 32-3.
9

°
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Italy, Poland, Greece, Russia, Austria and Hungary. This group became characterized as the
"new immigration," in direct contrast to the old immigrants now considered American, originally
from northwestern Europe. This period brought a greatly increased opposition to immigration,
and a national restrictive policy passed in 1882, the Chinese Exclusion Act. 12 It was not until this
later influx of immigration that Americans began to fully notice the limitations of space which
could be exacerbated by incoming waves of people. More restrictive laws began to be passed in
this era, and opposition to immigrants and immigration increased especially with the period of
economic depression from 1883-86. During this period, immigrants began to be associated or
seen as the cause of specific problems: labor and industrial discontent, lack of space, etc. 13
This period also saw the isolationism of previous years begin to give way to a different
awareness of the surrounding world, which corresponded to a rise in nationalist and jingoistic
sentiments. The 1890s saw a rise in anti-foreign violence, and an act was passed in 1891
tightening control over those entering US borders and giving the job of regulation and inspection
to the federal government. However, prosperity resumed after William McKinley took office in
1896, and anti-immigration sentiment decreased. 14 Higham notes, however, that these trendstowards and away from immigration restriction or anti-immigration sentiment-were not unified,
nor were they simple or uni-directional. They overlapped and shifted, in time and place and
population.
In the early 20 th century, the "new immigration" came to be associated with certain
stereotypes, and the discourse around difference with respect to immigration became racialized,
resulting in a nationalism that implied a threat from the immigrant otherness. Immigrants were
thought to be regressive and anti-social, and were associated with slums, crime, disease, and
12

Isbister, The Immigration Debate, 33.
Higham, Send These To Me, 37-9.
14
Ibid, 39-41.
13
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insanity. The new incoming nationalities seemed to endanger America as the previous ones
hadn't. In addition, the concern and desire for cultural homogeneity took on a racial form,
naturalizing the idea of nationalism. Higham summarizes, "At the deepest level, what impelled
the restriction movement in the early decades of the twentieth century was the discovery that
immigration was undermining the unity of American culture and threatening the accustomed
dominance·of a white protestant people of northern European descent. "15
What followed was a series of restrictions on immigration that targeted particular groups,
making certain categories-including both cultural/racial groups and members of revolutionary
organizations-undesirable. Quotas were placed on the different regions, expressly specifying
which regions were more preferable. The immigration law of 1921 limited European
immigration to 3% of the number of foreign-born of each nationality living the United States at
the time of the last available census from 1910. Even more restrictive legislation was passed in
1924, limiting immigration to 2% of the immigrant populations of 1890. This effectively limited
most of the origins of immigration to northwestern Europe. 16 Also around this period of the
1920s, there was a national desire to specify or assign national origins. The anxiety over the
incoming immigrants who seemed ethnically or racially "other" coincided with heightened
awareness or enforcement of ethnic and racial boundaries, as immigration is constantly entwined
with processes of racialization. This period was one of increasing anxiety about what
immigration meant for the social order, which was a place the conversation about immigration
had not occupied before, although it certainly would again. 17 In earlier years, when immigration
came to be considered at all, it was perceived in terms of assimilation and opportunity. Leaders
spoke of altruism, saying, who could deny members of other nations the opportunity to become
15

Ibid, 45-7.
Ibid, 54.
17
Ibid, 9.
16
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part of America, the greatest and most unique nation yet? Of course, the "welcome" was mostly
driven by American labor needs rather than altruism, but it was couched in awareness and
promotion of American greatness, diversity, and uniqueness. The national pride took on the role
of adoption, of asylum and safe harbor for members of lesser nations who could then become
subsumed into America and add to its richness of diversity. It was in the 20th century, when the
immigration took on a character associated with more inassimilable otherness, that it was thought
to have the potential to disrupt the social order.
There were also periods in the twentieth century when the anti-immigrant sentiment took
on the character of hostility against real or perceived disloyalty. World War I created hostility
toward German-Americans and all things German. This hostility took the form of calls for
"100% Americanism" and equated loyalty with social conformity. During the Depression of the
1930s, immigrants were seen as problematic for their potential contribution to the already
staggering numbers of unemployed. Restrictions and anti-immigrant sentiment continued
through the decades of the twentieth century up until 1965, halting much of the influx through
World War II and the 1950s. On the whole, immigration was little more than a trickle from 1924
to 1965. 18
Isbister identifies the fourth wave beginning in 1965, and it continues to the present. This
wave brought a very different group of immigrants; .they were primarily from "Third World"
countries, including those of Latin America and Asia. 19 This was facilitated by the 1965
Immigration Reform Act. The Act changed from the previous national origins quota system to
more equal immigration limits for all regions, and put family reunification and occupational

18
19

Ibid, 53-4, 57-60.
Isbister, The Immigration Debate, 33.
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skills needed or valued by the United States at the top of the priority list. 20 Higham notes that
once this wave of immigration began, another period of anxiety set in. It was reminiscent of the
1920s and the concern about racial difference, despite the 1965 law eliminating race and
ethnicity as admission criteria.21
This period brought the so-called "culture wars," debates over American culture and
national ideals. Ronald Schmidt interprets these culture wars as questioning the character of the
American population with respect to both origins and future populations: what is the significance
for America's national character of the historically excluded populations? Who are we?
Schmidt's argument is that this period of cultural questioning, in itself an exercise in selfdefinition of America, was deeply related to the sudden influx of immigration after 1965. This
point is key for understanding the relationship that the American nation had to its immigrants.
What the culture anxiety of the 1960s reflects is the fact that in each period of mass immigration
to the United States, many questions are asked and contested about the character of the nation.
Every time the fluidity of the "us and them" boundaries of the nation is brought to the fore by
immigration, we question what makes us "us" to begin with; being confronted with newcomers
makes us reflect on our own identity as a nation. As the next section will demonstrate, American
nationalism has always had to contend with the reality of a diverse American population, but the
methods developed for doing so have left much room for the exclusion of some immigrant and
other populations.

American Nationalism
In 1775, Benjamin Franklin said, with respect to immigration into what was then the
American colonies, "Why should Pennsylvania, founded by the English, become a colony of
20

Ronald Schmidt, Language Policy and Identity Politics in the United States (Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 2000), 120.
21
Higham, Send These To Me, 9.
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Aliens, who will shortly be so numerous as to Germanize us instead of our Anglifying [sic] them,
and will never adopt our language or customs, any more than they can acquire our
complexion." 22 From this, we can glean a certain view of the then barely-formed American
colonies: one that was English, and should remake any newcomers in the image of the English.
Franklin espouses a homogenizing effect of a particular sort: a unidirectional movement toward
the original and continuing English heritage of the American colonies. This point of view was
not the only one in the early years of the American nation, though, and it coexisted with the
belief that Europe, not England, was the parent country of America. The diversity of the early
American nation was used to argue for its individuality and therefore its legitimacy as a nation.

23

Still, the "assimilationist" view of the character of America with respect to its newcomers that
Franklin and others espoused continued to have a strong presence throughout American history,
although it shifted over the centuries and took different incarnations. It shared some traits,
including a belief in the American power to incorporate-whatever that incorporation entailedwith the later "melting pot" ideology which became popular in the late 19th and early 20
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centuries, in response to the third wave of immigration. 24 While Franklin had wanted any
newcomers to be Anglicized, the melting pot doctrine suggested that they would be
Americanized-that the unique America, having taken in so many immigrants from so many
different places, would absorb new immigrants into the American mix. The common thread was
a sense of being incorporated into the new world, and, to some degree, giving up one's claim to
previous identity. America was and is portrayed as special in its capacity to absorb and
transform difference, and in the perceived importance of doing so.

22
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In looking for the roots of these ideas about the American identity, Arthur Mann points to
the revolutionary generation. He quotes Alexis de Tocqueville, the French visitor to America in
the 1830s, as noting that there was a "patriotism of reflection," distinct from other more
"instinctive patriotisms" found in Europe. 25 Mann notes that this self-conscious nationalism,
particularly with respect to America's uniqueness, began to be voiced around the Revolutionary
period as a result of the lack of a common ethnicity. Instead of being based in a common history
or geographical location, as with many European nations, the American sense of patriotism was
more linked .to an ideology of "Americanism." In addition, citizenship in the older European
nations was based on birth, making it an ascribed citizenship status. American citizenship and
participation in the American nation was something that could be achieved-one did not simply
have to be born into it. Further, while one could be born an American ( simply by being born to
white parents who lived in America), a developed sense of American nationalism was also seen
as a requirement-commitment to the American ideals of freedom and individualism. That was
the factor seen as necessary to bind the country and its already diverse population together. 26
Alongside this ideological nationalism was a particular understanding of America with
respect to its newcomers, its immigrants. As Mann notes, after it won its own sovereignty, the
newly formed United States was the first country to decide, via its national policy, that it would
receive immigrants. However, these immigrants, should they seek to become part of America,
were required to assimilate ideologically. Since the United States has always been a popular
destination for immigrants, the question of how one is to become American if one is not born
that way has been a popular one. As Mann puts it, "The most persistent answer, inscribed in

25
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Mann, The One and the Many, 46.
Ibid, 46-7, 52-5.
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every naturalization law since the eighteenth century, is that one must identify with the founding
ideals of the Republic. " 27
This uniqueness of the American identity is complicated. Thus far, we can definitely see
a particular emphasis, or an ongoing focus, on the process of becoming an American, rather than
on the definition of Americanism by birth, since the meaning of Americanism .so often had to be
transferred to others. The influx of immigrants and attention to their significant numbers meant
that "instinctive nationalism," which would be conferred upon a citizen at birth, would not
suffice. That brand of nationalism can be much less self-conscious than the American variety,
since American nationalism has been more tied to sustained ideological commitment and
consciousness. Of course, these early ideas about who could become an American (by
subscribing to its ideology and renouncing former loyalties to other nations) did not include
certain groups: slaves and American Indians. Joshua Fishman identifies "the American dream"
and the American experience of national feeling as definitively ideological and non-ethnic. 28
However, he fails to acknowledge the separate and reduced position of racial minorities as
exceptions to the claim that ethnicity has no special privilege in the US. While the "American
ideology" that immigrants were expected to subscribe to was not ostensibly that of a particular
ethnic group, it was implicitly the expectations of the middle-class white Protestant group in the
United States.
As John Higham notes, the English who came to the New World did not consider
themselves immigrants, but settlers-they did not have to assimilate to anything. "Theirs was
the polity, the language, the pattern of work and settlement, and many of the mental habits to

27
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which immigrants would have to adjust. "29 The unspoken (or written) assumption was that the
immigrant groups who would come to the United States and want to assimilate would be able to
do so. Implicitly, this idea assumes that non-white immigrants would never be able to assimilate,
and thus that they were not yet considered even as potential for citizenry. All the same, despite
what now seems to be a limited selection pool for applicants (primarily white Europeans),
Americans believed that the process of Americanizing was possible for the newcomers; it just
required some definitive commitments and political-ideological shifts. In addition, as Mann
notes, from approximately the 1790s to the 1850s, what wasfearedabout immigrants and
immigration was not their bloodlines or their ethnicity (although again, at this time, the
immigrants under consideration were primarily white-black slaves and their descendents were
not regarded even as contenders .for American-ness). Rather, it was the ideas and the belief
systems of the immigrants that were threatening, and that was what needed to be overcome. In
the late 19th century the idea of Anglo-Saxon exclusiveness, and the implication of the inferior
stock of immigrants (similar to the one originally put forth by Benjamin Franklin), came into
popularity again. 30
Although he does not identify this belief with as specific a period, Nathan Glazer, writing
a decade before Mann, also argues that American nationalism, as well as its responses to other
nations and cultures, always took an ideological form. This meant both that it required
ideological assimilation from those who would become American, and that when it attacked
foreign cultures, it usually-with the notable exception of German-Americans in the period after
World War I-did not do so directly (meaning, in an approach claiming racialized inferiority of
immigrant groups). Rather, attacks would note the inferior ideas and conditions of the other

29
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culture: "authoritarianism, poverty, ignorance and inefficiency."31 We can see in this belief
assumption about the superiority and uniqueness of America ever-present in its brand of
nationalism. America was not one of the oldest nations like England was, but it was built on
foundations that allowed for much more population shift without fear of collapse, because
America is, theoretically, not ethnically based.
John Higham in the 1970s, agreeing with Mann, argues that because America lacks that
"truly rooted national tradition," the unifying factor of America and its people is a commitment
to the future. Within that, the most "notable" American traits are idealism, flexibility and
adaptability, appreciation for individual achievement and independence and "a tendency to
conform to the values of peers and neighbors instead of holding stubbornly to ancestral ways. "32
As noted above, Mann attributes similar American ideals and ideologies of adaptation and,
particularly, ability to take in newcomers without losing definition, to the revolutionary age.
These two arguments are not incompatible, but they present a slight confusion in the American
ideology. According to these theorists, America uses ideology to bind its people (or peoples,
depending on whom you ask) together, and to incorporate new immigrants into its population.
This ideological American nationalism is traceable to the founding of the nation itself, meaning
that even if it is not as old as some nations, American nationalism is still historically based. But
at the same time, the US prides itself on adaptability, and, due to its ideological status, its
freedom from the historically based prejudices plaguing older, more ethnically or religiously
based nations.
Gary Gerstle' s analysis, focusing primarily on the 20th century, points to the contradiction
in American nationalism that many of these scholars mention, but do not focus on: the fact that
31
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the ideological nationalism which claimed to be accessible to all was in fact only open to certain
racial and ethnic groups. What Gerstle refers to as "civic nationalism" is a political faith of
economic opportunity and political freedom for all human beings regardless of racial, religious,
or cultural background. As noted, this ideological nationalism was set down in the Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution. Theoretically, in order to attain citizenship in the American
nation, what one had to do was identify with its founding ideals of freedom, equality, and
democracy, and this was part of what made America unique as a nation. It was what appeared to
hold the country together, to make it uniquely resistant to internal divisions and strife.
But, as Gerstle and others have noted, this nationalism, the supposed ticket to
membership in the American nation, was not accessible to all. African-Americans and nonwhite immigrants were excluded from full acceptance for decades. Gerstle identifies this as
American "racial nationalism," which defined the American nation in terms of skin color, of
blood, and by the fitness for self-government that was allegedly inherited from those traits. This
nationalism was also inscribed in the Constitution, and in the 1790 law that gave naturalized
citizenship to all "free white persons," which facilitated the millions of immigrants who came to
the United States after that period. This law was modified in 1872, but while the 13 th
Amendment in 1865 freed the slaves, the 14th gave them citizenship, and the 15th gave them the
right to vote, the reality until the 1960s was ·very different, speaking to the continued belief in a
white nation. 33
From the founding decades through much of the 20th century, racial nationalism
continued to be a powerful factor in maintenance of the American nation. It could shift to
incorporate new whiteness, and the civic nationalism could be utilized in order to exclude
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immigrants who did not accept or absorb it by arguing that the immigrants were not fitting in
with American ideals. In this, it was a highly flexible nationalism, or rather, combination or
nationalisms, which were used to maintain the imagined community of the United States.
Between the two, America could be inclusive and exclusive at the same time, promoting its
tolerance and modernity and steadfastly believing in the accessibility of its ideology to all while
still viewing some-immigrants, descendants of slaves-as simply unassimilable, too Other. The
1960s and the Civil Rights movement shattered the illusion created by civic nationalism's
masking of the racial nationalism, and the combination was no longer enough to support the
diversity that continued to grow in leaps and bounds during the fourth wave of immigration. 34
From 1965 to the present day, the United States has seen increased anxiety with respect to its
growing (now primarily non-white) recent immigrant populations, and fears have again risen that
the incoming tide of immigration is too different to be Americanized in the way that the previous
waves have been. I believe this anxiety to be related to Americans' forced confrontation with the
false reality of their coexisting and contradictory nationalisms. There are other factors that play
into fears and anti-immigrant sentiment, such as economic hardship and concern for the job
market, and these are significant. But American national sentiment has not yet found a cohesive
way to deal with its current levels of diversity-a balance between ethnic group solidarity and
preservation and national unity-and it seems to me that this lack contributes heavily to current
America's unease about immigration.
The shaping of American nationalism throughout the years has always had to interact in
some way with the diversity of the American population. In creating a new kind of nation, the
founding populations also had to construct a new kind of nationalism, one that could unite people
of many different backgrounds on some common ground that would support their diversity. The
34
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efforts towards this end have not been unified; there are competing strains of nationalism at any
given time in any country. But the ideological nationalism and the racial nationalism that the
ideology cloaked attempted to maintain a common imagination that was accessible to as many
residents of America as possible. Recently, as the flaws in this imagination have been brought to
the fore, Americans attempting to hold the country together against what they see as an onslaught
of otherness are clinging to one of the few things most of them still have in common: the English
language.

American Language Policy and Debate: English as National Pride
In the United States today, policies regarding language have become extremely
contentious. The recent "English Only" movement is a significant force in the political arena,
calling for restrictions that would make English the only language taught in public schools and
the only "official language." The background for this current debate entwines with the history of
immigration to the United States, expressing American fears about unity and cohesion, the
process of immigrant otherness becoming racial otherness, and definitions of nationhood. As
Americans struggle to define themselves and their ties to each other, they implicate the histories
of exclusion and of assimilation. The struggle over the place of non-English languages today
illustrates the ongoing American anxieties over nationalism due to their mass immigration.
Ronald Schmidt notes that there are three primary areas of language battles: over
education, access to political and civil rights, and whether English should be the only official
language of the United States.35 Upon reading this, it is important to note again that the United
States does not have an official language, although this may come as a surprise to many readers.
The surprise is due to the fact that English is certainly the de facto official language in the United
States: it is the language of politics, the language in which all the major newspapers (the New
35

Schmidt, Language Policy and Identity Politics, 4.

21

York Times, the Los Angeles Times, the Boston Globe, and many more) are printed, the
language of public schools. In order to get most higher-level jobs, English-language proficiency
is required. There are numerous economic benefits to speaking English. However, it is still not
the "official" language, in the way that English and French are the "official" languages of
Canada and Spanish is the "official" language of Spain. English is simply the language that is
currently and has always been spoken most commonly in the United States.
Given this fact, it is counterintuitive that there would be an entire political movement
(and a very controversial one at that) centered around making English "official." The EnglishOnly initiative began on a national level in 1981, while some individual states, beginning with
Nebraska in 1920, had already adopted English as the sole official language. Other states
followed Nebraska, including Illinois in 1961, and then Virginia, Indiana, Kentucky, Tennessee,
California, Georgia, Arkansas, Mississippi, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina,
Arizona, Colorado, and Florida in the 1980s, and Alabama, New Hampshire, Montana, South
Dakota, Wyoming, and Alaska in the 1990s. The individual statutes or amendments in the
different states varied as to their specific purpose and content, as well as how strict they were
about the meaning of the "official" language. Nonetheless there are also two officially bilingual
states in the US: New Mexico, which has been bilingual English and Spanish since 1912, and
Hawaii, which is bilingual in English and Hawaiian since 1978.36 According to Carol Schmid,
when the boundaries of the Southwest states were drawn, there were language politics involved
in the process. Of course, the Southwest has some of the highest numbers of Spanish-speakers in
the country because of the integration of what had previously been parts of Mexico into the
United States. When the state boundaries were decided, they were drawn in such a way as to
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ensure a Spanish minority. New Mexico, for example, was granted statehood only in 1912, after
an Anglo majority was attained in the region. 37
The shifting character of immigration to the United States has of course also meant
changes over time in the non-English languages being spoken. Since the early days of the
American colonies, there have been multiple languages spoken-primarily indigenous
languages, colonial languages (such as Spanish) and immigrant languages. Until 1950, Germanspeakers were the largest non-English speaking group in the United States, being a very
prominent immigrant group from the early years of the nation. 38 In 1910, when the Germarispeaking population was at its height in the United States, there were 2,759,000 foreign-born
individuals whose mother tongue was German, and 6,058,300 American born children offirstgeneration German-Americans, for a total of 8,817,300 German Americans. From the early
I

years of the nation, the German speakers in America have made significant efforts at
maintenance of the German language, succeeding for the most part through the beginning of the
twentieth century. The 1830s witnessed a movement in Pennsylvania, which was home to many
German immigrants, for the admission of German into the courts, use in public documents, and
schools; that movement enjoyed some successes. German was the only language aiming for
"large-scale coexistence" with English in the 19th century, and it seemed for a time that it might
succeed at claiming an official language position in some states. 39 However, the anti-German
hostility that was a product of World War I caused a great language shift away from German and
towards English, and in subsequent years German immigration to the United States never again
reached the levels it had attained previously. After this point, the dynamics changed, and in the
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1980s and 90s, Spanish became by far the most common non-English language spoken, and
other Asian languages, particularly Asian Indian languages and Vietnamese, increased rapidly
over the decade ofthe 1980s. 40
However, the rise of non-English languages was not the only cause for concern among
advocates of English-Only. The separate, but related, issue of the rates at which speakers of
foreign languages are learning English is also of concern. According to the 1990 Census,
"native-born people still constitute half of the people in the United States, aged 5 and older, who
speak languages other than English in their homes ... ,[and that] native-born people also make up
at least a third of the home speakers of non-English languages who have difficulty speaking
English.',4 1 It is this aspect of immigration and multilingual multiculturalism that causes some
individuals and political groups in the United States to fear that the English language is
endangered. Currently, there are many lobbying groups for the institution of English as the only
official language of the United States, which include US English and English First. From US
English, Schmidt quotes Guy Wright as saying "this English-speaking nation [will be] turned
into a poly-lingual babel.''42
There have always been immigrants living in the United States who either do not speak
English or who speak another language in addition to English, although during the World War
and post-War periods, the numbers would have been minimal. Because of this continuing
presence of non-English languages, one of the primary linguistic battlegrounds has been the
schools. Education policy for language minority students grew out of other minority movements
battling for equal rights and opportunities. Indeed, in the 1960s and 70s, the multi- or bilingual
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education policies being advocated were framed as an extension of equal opportunity rights for
minorities (which inherently assumed that proficiency in a non-English language was a handicap
to be overcome). Later, the debate over education policies became a debate over "transitional"
versus "maintenance" approaches, each with the associated different value on the non-English
language itself. There was, and continues to be, strong opposition to the maintenance of nonEnglish languages. Often, this opposition takes the form of defense of the American nation and
its founding ideals. Ronald Reagan is quoted as saying that bilingualism is against "American
concepts." 43 The opposition also utilizes the argument that it takes a single language to make a
unified "nation," harkening to Benedict Anderson's "imagined community" nation. In this view,
since most of the citizens of a nation will never meet and are not related, they must have other
ways to feel connected to each other-to see themselves as part of the same group. The English
r

Only movement and its goals imply that in order for this group feeling to be achieved in such a
diverse country, everyone must speak the same language. In order to feel like a community,
then, we must be able to, quite literally, understand each other.
The assimilationist view of the situation is that linguistic pluralism is an actual threat to
national unity, as the common language of English is the only factor holding this incredibly
diverse country together.44 Portes and Rumbaut note that this dependence on language as the
sustainer of nationhood and national identity makes sense given the diverse roots of American
nationality. "In a country lacking centuries-old traditions and culture and simultaneously
receiving millions of foreigners from the most diverse lands, language homogeneity came to be
seen as the bedrock of nationhood and collective identity. ,,4s
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It is worthwhile at this point to consider the results of sociolinguistic research in this
question of whether the English language is being threatened (or corrupted) by the influx of
immigrants and their languages. Deborah Schildkraut notes that, as English already is the de
facto official language, most non-English speakers know the benefits of being proficient.
Indeed, most want to, and do, learn English.46 As John Isbister remarks that, contrary to fears
about the welfare of the English language, there have always been immigrants who do not speak
English, but that they are learning at similar or faster rates, meaning that the proportionate
numbers of immigrants who do not speak English seem to be decreasing. This makes sense,
given the far more limited economic opportunities available to non-English speakers in an
English-speaking country. Isbister cites a study by Jasso and Rosenzweig comparing nonEnglish-speaking immigrants in 1980 with their counterparts in 1900 (when German speakers
were the largest non-English speaking immigrant group). In the 1900 census, 12% of immigrant
men and 15% of immigrant women could not speak English. The 1980 census records 6% of
immigrant men and 9% of immigrant women unable to speak English, showing that non-English
speaking is about half as common in recent years as it was during the early 20th century. 47
Joshua Fishman, noting the even broader reach of the American values on the English
language, writes,
"All Americans, and speakers of non-English languages in particular, are aware
of the value our society and its institutions place upon cultural and linguistic unity. The
desirability of such unity is explicitly or implicitly conveyed by citizenship requirements,
by voting requirements, by the common public school, by the many agencies whose task
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it is to "naturalize" and Americanize immigrants and our indigenous or semi-indigenous
ethnic populations, by national holidays ... ,,4s
This public awareness of the value of speaking English is supported by data showing that greater
percentages of Spanish spe~ers think that immigrants should learn to speak English. This
contradicts the stereotype that immigrants, particularly from Spanish-speaking countries, do not
want to learn English.

"US Citizens and
Residents Should
Learn English"
Strongly agree
Agree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Total

Mexican

Puerto Rican

Cuban

251
29.1%
537
62.3%
62
7.2%
12
1.4%
862
100%

142
25.0%
386
67.7%
32
5.6%
10
1.7%
569
100%

79
25.6%
206
66.8%
19
6.1%
5
1.6%
309
100%
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Schildkraut and Schmidt also espouse the view that there is more to the debate over
language than language. There are other views about the origins and basis for this fear of the
invasion of non-English languages. Given that these fears seem to be, for the most part,
unsupported by evidence, and that English is alive and well, there must be another reason for the
strong sentiment in favor of making English official. The view held by linguistic pluralists is
that linguistic prejudice is a replacement for overt racism, which is no longer officially
sanctioned and must therefore be practiced and expressed more discretely. 50 Another argument
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relates to the economic security of the nation, and states that people are generally more hostile to
immigrants when they believe that the nation or their immediate family is economically
vulnerable, and thus official-English is an expression of that hostility and desire to "fook after
our own" first. 51 However, both Schildkraut and Schmidt argue that there are other, more
complex factors at work. As Schmidt's title implies, language policies are identity politics: they
are expressions of conceptions of American identity. Following from this, movements for
bilingual education as well as the movements that oppose them are actually debates about
cultural identity. In Schmidt's framework, there are two competing public values invoked in
these debates: national unity and equality. He notes that the conflict can also be framed as
linguistic or cultural status equality versus social integration of ethnolinguistic groups. 52
Schildkraut argues that the language debates are about the safety of the American nation,
meaning its ideological maintenance. "For some, this process will still involve a degree of
racism, but for many, the ideals that are considered to make America unique are seen as
endangered without a single public language." She explores several definitions ·of being
American: the ethnocultural or hereditary (in which being American comes from _birth rather
than naturalization) idea versus the adoptable or assimilationist (in which true Americans have
American citizenship or believe American ideals), and argues that either definition can lead to
willingness to impose immigration restrictions. 53 The first can easily imply that immigrants,
since they were not born in America, will never truly be American. The second, because it
implies that whoever wants to become American can, can lead to hostility towards immigrants
because by definition, an 'immigrant' is someone who is not yet American and thus does not try
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hard enough to become so. In her argument, national identity is a symbolic predisposition that
shapes the way an individual or group acts towards the nation and towards its immigrants, and
which can imply ·a set.of expectations about the relationship between "us" and "them" that is
expressed in language policy. 54
American ideology, we have seen, developed around the need to maintain a cohesive
nation given the high percentages of immigrants and citizens from many different nationalities,
ethnicities, and cultures. The resulting nationalism was designed to accomm~date many
different backgrounds, as it was ostensibly based on an ideology that could be attained (although
of course it hid a racial requirement). But as the nation continued to diversify, and as the true
racial nature of American nationalism came to light, there have appeared to be many cracks in
the nation resulting from the racial, ethnic, and linguistic groupings, which overlap and
intertwine. These cracks, it is feared, could become divisive and disrupt America's cohesion.
As a result, many American citizens cling to language as a factor that they believe can hold the
nation together against this potential for instability. And Schildkraut, referencing Schmidt, notes
that "Language policies that recognize multiple languages in the public sphere challenge
personal and deeply felt notions of one's own standing as a member of the national
community. ,,ss Language, immigration, and nationalism are each all about defining who is "us"
and who is "them" so that those doing the imagining can believe themselves to be part of the
greater community. But this emphasis on language and the implied belief that only one language
can be American can actually alienate more immigrants who are forced to abandon their previous
language as they learn English. The reality of the American population and its existence as a
nation, with so many different contributing cultures and peoples, dismisses the practicality of this
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dependence on language as a binding factor. At this point in the United States, as well as Canada
as this thesis will show, language has become a point of contention instead of unity, an area
where many of each country's citizens feel (correctly, I would argue) that they are being
mistreated. One language might have held us together if there were not so many others, but as it
is, non-English speaking Americans make up an extremely significant part of the American
population, and non-English languages represent important cultural ties to identity. In addition,
speaking English need not require abandonment of an immigrant's native language. The
bilingualism of immigrants is a resource that we should preserve; it benefits the greater cultural
understanding, and perhaps less money would need to be spent on teaching a second language to
the country's elite university students if more of the country's children could speak another
language to begin with.
Some Americans, advocates of English Only and similar movements, might point to
Canada as evidence for the potentially disruptive nature of official bilingualism given the
continued cries for secession from French-speaking Quebec. But the next section will
demonstrate that Canada's tension comes, not from bi- or multilingualism itself, nor the fact of
Canada's diversity, but from the particular implementation of policies of multiculturalism and
bilingualism. These policies have so far failed to promote the kind of maintenance and common
understanding of Canada's many cultural groups that would constitute true pluralism. The
United States's current policies are certainly different than Canada's, and would be interacting
with a different history and different senses of national identity, but they could still produce more
tensions with respect to immigration and immigrant populations, and cause more, not less, doubt
and conflict over American national identity.

Chapter 3: Canada

30

Multiculturalism, a national project spurning assimilation and conformity, is one that has,
in some ·ways, dominated recent decades of Western history. How to reconcile liberty and
community, diversity and unity? How to respect the ever-growing mixture of populations, no
longer categorically unified by color, race, or creed, while simultaneously preserving the spirit of
national pride and loyalty? As the historians and scholars of American history have noted above,
the "melting pot" metaphor was discarded in recent years for emphasizing the homogenizing
effect of American nationalism, one which had become distasteful to the newer generations of
multiculturalist scholars, activists and citizens. "Mosaic" has become a more recent substitute
metaphor, which attempts to acknowledge the goal .of preservation of individual pieces of the
national/cultural puzzle, rather than their dissolution into the pre-existing whole. It also implies
the wish to ·have the nation shaped by the addition of individual pieces, to have the project of
nationalism, in some ways, accommodate the influx of cultures from outside in such a way that
they, in tum, influence the whole of the nation. "Mosaic" may have an aesthetic appeal to
multiculturalists in search of a metaphor. But sociologically it is misleading because it implies a
changeless fixity, when ethnic groups actually shift with time and can have fluid, nebulous
boundaries.
Still, Canada has been held up as an example of state-sponsored multiculturalism, of
institutionalized projects of diverse nationalism, necessitated in part by the country's bilingual
and bicultural heritage. Canada has two national languages, French and English. However the
national project of maintenance of those two major cultural or linguistic groups, along with the
process of "integration," the term used often to describe the absorption of large numbers of
immigrants into the Canadian nation, is not without its own complications of theory and
implementation. Beneath the cliches of Canadian multi ethnic and multicultural glory, there are
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inconsistencies of ideas and theories about the ethnic and cultural boundaries that influence
policy decisions and practice. These tangles require close examination.

Canadian Immigration
. In their exploration of Canadian immigration policy, Ninette Kelley and Michael
(

Trebilcock argue that the policies and procedures regarding immigration are the basis for the
maintenance of the modern nation-state. How do we define, qualify, or understand membership
in a national community? As has been noted before by the scholars of the American national
project as well, in order to define a nation, or national community, one must define what lies
outside it. Without "them," there is no "us." Richard J. Joy writes that everyone who lives in
Canada at the time of the book's writing ( 1992) is either an immigrant or the descendent of
immigrants.56 'While he acknowledges the limitations of this statement (for example, it says
nothing about the Native populations, who are not really immigrants), he also allows it to carry
weight for making an important declaration about the nature of the Canadian population.
However, more specificity is required before diving into an examination of the way in which this
fact, or Canadian perceptions of it, has influenced Canadian policy and national identity.
Canadian history, like the history of the United States, is filled with the tales of foreigners
settling Canadian soil for varied purposes and with equally varied results. However, also like the
United States, it is easy to claim multiculturalism on the basis of this past diversity without
closely examining the limitations and intricacies of that diversity and its reception and perceived
place in the receiving country. As in the US, the current situation in Canada with respect to
immigration is full of debate and doubts about the process of "integration." Weinfeld and
Wilkinson point out the vagueness of this term, implying that it is related to the ambiguity of
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Canadian feelings ,and opinions about immigration itself and the associated issues of identity and
difference. A brief history of Canadian immigration and language policy displays this
uncertainty surrounding its newcomers.
Before 1760, at the time of the British conquest of Quebec, French and British North
American colonies were little more than trading posts. Then, following the American War for
Independence in the late 18th century, this changed. Through the mid-19 th century, there was a
large flow of "pauper immigration" from Britain, especially Ireland. 57 The character of
immigration during this period was connected to the Imperial view of the role of the colonies.
This view was shaped by mercantilist theories of economic development, proclaiming that the
value of a colony lay in its raw materials to be sold back to the home country and as a modest
market for the home country's goods. Thus, an influx of poor workers who could be controlled
and exploited for little reward was

a. benefit to the colonies and their parent countries.

In

addition, the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the Industrial Revolution in Europe meant that
Britain and France had a surplus oflabor. Accordingly, Britain saw the colonies as an outlet for
excess, possibly troublemaking labor. The problem could be exported to the colonies, where
labor needs could be met by the newcomers. 58 This relatively open policy benefited both
economic groups in Britain and landowners and businesses in the colonies. As Ronald Schmidt
notes the early newcomers from other nations who came to settle a new territory-whether by
their own design or by the force of others-may not have considered themselves immigrants.
There is a difference between immigrants and settlers, and a difference in turn between settlers
and imported subjugated workers. 59
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The federal Dominion of Canada was formed in 187 6-the process is referred to as
Confederation. After this point, the country's leadership saw the immigration policy as part of
the national development and national identity project-a larger population was needed both for
the sake of the economy and for the independent spirit of the new nation in order for it to be
successful. However, Kelley and Trebilcock are quick to note that this open policy was not due
to any sort of liberalism or altruism in the government, but as part of the nation-building project,
with national self-interest at heart. In addition, immigrants were viewed as a cheap labor source
and had very limited citizenship rights. 60 Native Canadians did not think of the incoming
workers as potential citizens, or part of the collective community or developing culture of
Canada. They saw these workers as only cheap, exploitable labor. However, these immigrant
workers were a significant part of the early nation-building project, as they helped to increase the
population significantly, and maintain a functioning economy and an independent polity. The
transition from colony to nation was facilitated by this population influx. We can see here the
importance of immigrants for Canada to present itself as a nation both to its own citizens and to
the surrounding world (including its parent countries.) The rate of influx needed could not be
filled from within the country, so it was filled from outside.
From 1876 to the 1900s, immigration was debated from many sides. Employers wanted
an open policy of immigration and even aggressive promotion of it for the purposes of acquiring
enough labor to keep wages low. The trade unions, on the other hand, wanted the opposite
policy for the same reasons-immigrants supposedly drove wages lower, displaced workers and
undermined strikes. On the other hand, the Anglo-Canadian nationalists also wanted
immigration restrictions, but for the purpose of developing a homogenous society with British
values, traditions and institutions. These nationalists echoed Anglo-centric voices from early
6
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America such as John Jay and Benjamin Franklin. In yet another view, French Canadians were
interested in maintaining the balance (linguistic and cultural) between the British and French
populations. 61
Despite doubt over the assimilability of certain groups of immigrants, white undesirables
were allowed entry because of the pressure to settle the expansive West, and then nonwhites
were recruited to fill the need for labor in these developing parts of the nation. This situation
was similar to that of the US in the 1890s, where labor and economic needs overwhelmed
resistance to immigration on racial grounds. The Chinese were recruited to build railroads, much
like in the United States, and likewise were treated poorly, and once the need decreased,
immigration slowed. In 1885, immigration policy required a head tax on Chinese entry, and in
1923 they were excluded completely. During the late 19th century and into early 20 th century in
Canada, the more "desirable" immigrants were those who were perceived as more assimilable. 62
From 1896 to 1914, general immigration increased, resulting in over 3 million people
immigrating to Canada, many of them from central and southern Europe, and often settling in the
growing cities. In addition to the employers, labor unions and nationalist groups who had
previously debated immigration, other voices of resistance to immigration were heard. Law
enforcement groups argued that immigrants brought violence because they had different values
and traditions. Social service organizations and some churches. expressed alarm at urban
crowding and ethnic ghettos, and some physicians and sociologists argued that immigrants
brought inferior genes. 63 While these debates were important and growing, Kelley and
Trebilcock state that the successive Canadian governments paid more attention to the economic
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arguments in favor of immigration, which resulted in a mostly open policy. Nonetheless,
amendments to the Immigration Act in 1906 and 1910 allowed for more selectivity to diminish
the number "undesirables," primarily Asians. 64 Again we can see similarity to the United States.
Race arguments were certainly used to promote restrictions on immigration, and that strongly
influenced the thinking of many citizens, but economic concerns counted at least as much.
Whether those economic concerns led to more open immigration when labor needs were high, or
to increased animosity towards immigrants when a poor economy leads citizens to fear for their
jobs, the financial and economic concerns of the nation and its citizens are significant in
determining national policy and public opinion about immigrants and immigration.
From 1915 to 1930, there were not many changes to the policy. World War I resulted in
a decrease in immigration that stayed low after the war because of economic uncertainty.
Despite the economic basis for earlier immigration policies, the World Wars increased the
prejudice against immigration in general. Within Canada, almost 9,000 "individuals of enemyalien birth" were imprisoned. In 1919, the deportation provisions, mostly for labor and political
activists, were strengthened. The 1920s brought the,exclusion of virtually all Asian immigrants.
By this time, there was no more pressing need for labor-British and European workers would
suffice, allowing the prejudices to influence the policy decisions in a new way. 65
In the 1930s, economic and other interests dovetailed, resulting in high support for the
government's restrictive immigration policy, partly because of the economic depression. There
was some controversy over the deportation policy. The policy's massive deportation of indigent
immigrants caused some officials to argue that the treatment was cruel and inhumane, while
others saw the policy as an effective way of reducing the strain on welfare budgets. There was
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also significant removal of labor activists, usually using the fear of communism, which
eventually garnered intellectual and liberal press criticism. 66
Following the trend of xenophobia and anti-immigrant feeling spiking during periods of
war, World War II brought the forced relocation and confiscation of property of nearly·all
Japanese-descended Canadians and the exclusion of Jewish refugees. As Kelley and Trebilcock
note, both policies had wide support, reflecting the ideological, cultural and racial values held by
the Canadian population at large. 67 Canadian citizens and government believed that the Japanese
immigrants would side with Japan, no matter how long they had lived in Canada. 68 After the
war, the implications of Nazi racial views provoked a questioning of the immigration policies,
leading to a willingness to accept displaced refugees (many of whom were Jewish). Kelley and
Trebilcock note pointedly that Canada was still slower than other countries in opening its borders
to these refugees despite an economic boom. ·In addition, during this period, there was a clear
order of preference for immigrants, with British immigrants at the top, and Asians, Africans and
West Indians at the bottom. This policy was expressed in such measures as transport regulations
(on Sikhs and other South Asians), head taxes and outright exclusion (on the Chinese)-and was
justified with the argument that some ethnic groups were from cultures that were clearly inferior
to the British and French culture. Particularly, Canadian citizens viewed southern and eastern
European and Asian immigrant values as too different from Canadian values to adapt. 69 There
was also a greater willingness to accept refugees fleeing from left-wing than right-wing regimes,
and Communist sympathies (or perceived ones) could act as a disqualifier for entry. 70
Immigration acts after this point changed fairly frequently and demonstrate the changing
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dynamics around immigration. A 1952 act lifted some earlier restrictions but still gave
preference to immigrants from certain countries, including the United Kingdom, Ireland, the
United States, and some European countries. The Immigration Act of 1962 was the first to put
some preference on labor skills, but still made immigrating more difficult for nonwhites. 71
In the 1960s and 70s, there was increasing support and consensus for the idea that Canada
should have racially non-discriminatory immigration policies, for a more open immigration
policy, and for the argument that immigrants should have some due process rights and
protections. New political influences emerged, as well: the ethnic, religious, and community
organizations grew in importance as they gained political influence. External considerations,
related to Canada's role in the British Commonwealth and the United Nations, also contributed
to a feeling that Canada should have a non-discriminatory policy, since a discriminatory one
would look bad in the global theater. 72
As a result, by the 70s, the policies were becoming decidedly more liberal. A 1976
Immigration Act stated "admission to Canada should not be based on 'race, nationality or ethnic
origin, colour, religion or sex. "'73 But then in the late 70s and early 80s, those policies and the
previous consensus were tested by what was perceived as a refugee crisis. There was an increase
in numbers of refugees claiming sanctuary at the Canadian border, many from non-traditional
source countries. This influx was seen as threatening to overwhelm the borders and admission
processes. The government enacted legislation to control the refugee entries, but only after
considerable debate in which the ethnic, religious and community organizations actively
participated. Through the 1980s and 90s, however, a relatively open door policy remained in
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placed despite economic recessions. 74 This period and the significant influx of non-European
immigrants led to changes in about multiculturalism in relation to official policy. In effect
Canadian nationalism and the character of immigration faced close scrutiny. Before this time,
the non-British or French European immigrants-were the "third element," or "other cultural
groups" that contributed to the multicultural Canadian society. 75 In 1986 and 87, over 40% of
the incoming immigrants were from Asia and only 24% were from Europe (including the United
Kingdom and Ireland). 76 By force of numbers alone, Canada had to examine in a critical way the
previous racialization of its immigration policy.
In the midst of recent policy decisions, and the growing emphasis on multiculturalism
(made explicit with the Multiculturalism Act of 1988), Canada was utilizing certain definitions
of culture, ethnicity, and pluralism, in its attempts to create a stable nation. As with the United
States, the development of immigration policies is inextricably intertwined with the politics of
the minority populations. Peter Li argues that the production and maintenance of ethnic and
racial groups are tied to nationhood formation, linguistic competition and political contests. 77
The controversial discussion and arguments around "integration" show doubts over the unity of
the Canadian nation as well as its relationship to its immigrants. Other nations and cultural
theorists view Canada as a model of successful immigrant "integration," for lack of a better term
at the moment. Within the term itself, we can see debate and confusion over what exactly
successful, beneficial, or reasonable immigration policy really is.
Weinfeld and Wilkinson comment on this question, noting the obscurity of the term
"integration." They argue that while Canada has, in some ways, been changed by its immigrants,
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"integration" as it is widely understood is still a one-way process where the pressure for change,
for "integration," rests on the immigrant rather than the receiving nation. The character of
Canadian immigration has changed over time, and some argue that the immigrants now are far
more different from Canadian culture than immigrants have been in the past. 78 Much like in the
United States, recent waves of immigration have prompted increased cir renewed concern about
the absorption potential of the receiving country. In Canada, immigrant groups can retain some
of their native cultures (and languages) through such means as newspapers, television, other
cultural centers and communication, but the parts that are most at odds with mainstream
Canadian culture and society are the least likely to be maintained, probably because of cultural
pressure to change. Islam is often singled out to show how some values simply seem to be
incompatible with "the premises of Canadian liberal democracy." The Multiculturalism Act
would seem to promote the idea that the receiving country has some responsibility to change to
accommodate the immigration, but the anti-immigrant sentiment that persists seems to contradict
the effectiveness of the act in promoting this two-way process of change. Weinfeld and
Wilkinson pointedly note that this concern about the different-ness of current immigration
bypasses the idea that a "true" test of a pluralist liberal democracy is the extent to which it can
accommodate difference. 79 Foreign-born Canadians constituted 17.4% of the population at the
time of Weinfeld and Wilkinson's writing. And they note that Canada has been transformed by
its immigrants, even though that was not historically- or presently the intention of the
immigration policy, first intended simply to fill an economic need. Canadian culture is not
monolithic, or perhaps even primarily bi-cultural. 80
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Kelley and Trebilcock note that the history of Canadian immigration, with respect to
strangers both inside and outside the gates, has continuing effects on the efforts of Canada to
understand itself. The issue of immigration continues to be a very contentious one. In October
1998, the Canadian immigration plan stated that it would keep the numbers level, reportedly to
placate Canadian citizens who did not want an increase. Related to the high unemployment rate,
it also called for more independent and business/entrepreneur immigrants, and fewer families. 81
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the policies of immigration-of deciding who is and is
not part of a nation-are a key method for maintaining a modem nation-state, for establishing its
boundaries, defining its character (if there is such a thing as national character, which many of
the theorists claim there is), and determining its citizenship. This process intertwines with other
identity politics of ethnicization and racialization to create boundaries within boundaries.
Multicultural Canadian Nationalisms
As stated previously, Canada is unique among modem nations in its official, statesponsored project of multiculturalism. It is also an example of a nation that has managed to exist
for over a hundred years with two widely spoken (and now official) languages, neither one being
subsumed or assimilated by the other. In these ways, Canada seems to be a very different kind of
nation from the "traditional," or European model. It seems, in many ways, to have achieved the
kind of "multicultural nationalism" which can accommodate the diversity of the modem age. It
has certainly been compared (internally and externally) to American attempts at maintaining a
nationalism that can allow for the diversity of the population. However, this nationalism is not
without its own agenda, one that can and has included oppression, exclusion, tokenization, and
assimilation of the minority populations of Canada. A closer look reveals the contradictions and
ambiguities of Canadian nationalism.
81
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Canada's Multiculturalism Act of 1988 officially recognized multiculturalism "as a
fundamental characteristic of Canadian heritage and identity."82 Much like the United States,
Canada's history is replete with immigration and diverse populations thrust together. Given this
fact, official multiculturalism makes sense-there must be some acknowledgment of the diversity
of the population amidst nationalism so that all of Canada's citizens can identify themselves with
the nation despite their cultural differences. As Benedict Anderson has noted, nations
differentiate themselves from other nations by the stories they tell about themselves, and create
the bond of the "imagined community" within the nation. Canada's history shares some
significant similarities with the United States, and while Canada's nationalism has had a different
evolution than America's there are certain parallel themes in their methods of dealing with the
"other."
Both the United States and Canada are "settler colonies," meaning that the founding
populations were colonizers from another, pre-existing nation-in the case of Canada, the
founding populations were French and English, who inhabited the land once populated by
Canada's First Nation. 83 Despite severe depopulation, some aboriginal groups remained, and in
the 18th and 19th centuries, other non-British or French immigrants added to the heterogeneity of
Canada's population. In some ways, Canada was a "multicultural nation" at the outset in a way
similar to the United States. But like the United States, the appearance of heterogeneity by iteslf
does not necessarily indicate a multicultural nation in the way that it was viewed and constructed
by its inhabitants and its leaders. And constructed it was-the position of the "new nation".(as
differentiated from the "traditional" European nation) is that it must openly develop a distinct
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national character in a self-conscious way. The nationalisms of the United States and Canada
have always reflected a greater self-consciousness than an ethnic nationalism, which does not
need to be so. From Confederation in 1876, Canada (which had previously been three territories
of Canada, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia) was plagued with local and provincial loyaltiesin
addition to French resistance, all of which threatened the newly created national unity. Added to
this, Canada had agreed to freer trade with the post-Civil War United States, which for some of
the population carried the fear of being subsumed into the neighboring nation to the south. 84
Frances Henry and Carol Tater argue, looking at the period of Confederation, that the
Canadian founding fathers ignored the cultural and racial plurality that existed in the 19th century
and created a national discourse that credited Canada's uniqueness (and thus its legitimacy as a
nation) to its distinctive blend of English and French values. Three categories were created:
English Canadians, French Canadians, and "others." Only Canadians of English and French
origin had constitutional rights. 85 As noted in the section on Canada's immigration history,
Canada was far from empty when the English and French settlers arrived, but European diseases,
violence, and the land development projects of the settlers largely devastated Canada's native
populations. 86 Still, some aboriginal populations remained. However, Eva Mackey identifies the
early colonial period (the years prior to Confederation) as the beginning of Canadian narratives
of tolerance, narratives that would become an important part of the official policies and project
of multiculturalism. Because it was in large part intertribal wars and plague that reduced the
Native populations so drastically, the settlers could claim innocence-later placed sharply in
con~rast with the American tradition of cowboys hunting and killing Natives for sport. Actually,
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Mackey notes, this was not because of natural tolerance, but more because of the essential
economic role the remaining Natives played in the early Canadian colonial project. In the 19th
century, the place of Natives in the Canadian narrative began to shift from the more assimilable
helpers of the early settlers to more Othered, unassimilable, and negative-in short, their image
became more racialized. But the narratives of the tolerant Canadian nation were already
developing, utilizing the image of the Other (and the Canadian treatment of it) to differentiate
Canada from the United States as well as manage what would become the hierarchy of difference
in the nation. 87
In response to the search for a Canadian national identity in the 19th century and the
worry about being absorbed in to the United States, the Canada First Movement developed. It
identified Canada as strongly "northern," British, and filled with the "heritage of northern races,"
which meant whiteness. This racialized view of "Canadianness" emphasized the importance of
the link between Canada and Britain as well as other northern and civilized nations, to
differentiate peoples (races) according to the northern vs. southern dichotomy, and to
differentiate the Canadian population from the American one. The US, this movement claimed,
was tainted by its southern cli~ate as well as the immigration from uncivilized countries and had
lost the ties to its Anglo-Saxon roots. In addition, the French-English relations, fraught though
they may sometimes have been, also served to emphasize the distinctiveness of Canada. Mackey
argues that this view of the Canadian population could be mobilized to promote celebration, both
of Canada's homogeneity and heterogeneity at once. The Anglo and French populations were
similar ("homogeneous") because both were white, northern populations in contrast to the
heterogeneous mix of "polluted" "southern" races in the US. But Canadian devotion to the
British crown during the war for American Independence as well as the continued presence of
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the French demonstrates that Canada is a nation in which minorities can retain local traditions,
proving Canada's heterogeneity and commitment to some form of diversity. Here, there is an
inconsistent construction of cultural pluralism, in which the English-French combination is
sometimes called "diversity" and other times, "homogeneity."88
With respect to the early years of Confederation, Mackey emphasizes the ways that
immigration was utilized in the national image very flexibly, much like the construction of
cultural pluralism above. Immigration was necessary for the national project, but not always
welcome in the amount of difference it brought to Canada. Later, it could be claimed as a part of
the national character when doing so supported the image of Canada as an example of tolerance
and state-sponsored pluralism. Originally, the British-centered project of Canadian nationalism
would have indicated a preference for British labor to fill the huge need, but recruitment of those
immigrants was insufficient. Instead, Canadians turned to Slavs and then Chinese to build the
railroad. When that project was finished in 1885, the need diminished, and between 1878 and
1899 the British Columbia legislature passed over 26 bills aimed at restricting or preventing the
settlement of Asians. During this period, the Canadian nationalist arguments opposing
immigration of "undesirable" groups relied on a framework of "environmental racism." Blacks
and Asians, policymakers argued, wer~ unsuited to Canada because of its northerly climate. This
harkens back to the British-centric nationalism implemented after Confederation. However,
given that immigration was clearly necessary for the economic success of the nation, it was
accepted and justified in a way that benefited the Canadian national project. Immigration was
intended to combat the forces of separatism from within, protect against the expansionist
tendencies of the United States, and preserve British hegemony. Later, though, immigration was
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used to frame Canada as a land of opportunity, demonstrating the historical basis for statesponsored pluralism. 89
Through the early 20th century, Canada was still seen as actively searching for a national
character, and after World War II, the first strains of a multiculturalist policy began to appear.
From the post-war period through the early 90s, Canada took pride it is immigration policy,
which brought mostly immigrants from Western Europe and the United States. Country leaders
as well as some citizens thought that Canada's "authentic nationalism" could be its embracing of
diversification. 90 However, a nationalism composed of celebration of diversity is complex in its
attitudes toward ·difference, and not all Canadians agrede that this multiculturalist nationalism is
functional. Henry and Tater argue that other Canadians see their national image as threatened by
contemporary multiculturalism. Instead, these Canadians subscribe to the image of a Canada
that is unique because of its English-French duality. The multiculturalism policy is a statesanctioned proliferation of cultural difference, and some fear that this disrupts Canadian unity.
Henry and Tater also note thatthere is high opposition to policies and programs for immigrants
in Canada, particularly racial minorities. They write that many Anglo-Canadians do not trust
multiculturalism to solve what is perceived as the "national identity crisis," and argue for a return
to Anglo-assimilation or biculturalism because multiculturalism threatens Canadian common
culture, values and national identity. In addition, there is a worry that recognizing other political
groups (rather than just individual ethnics) will upset the power balance between French- and

English-speaking Canadians. Henry and Tater argue that in Canada, the pluralism allowed for by
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multiculturalism is premised in a hierarchy that merely "allows" non-dominant cultures'
participation in the dominant culture. 91
Mackey takes a slightly different view of the policy of multiculturalism and its
repercussions. She identifies the "Benevolent Mountie Myth" (the previously mentioned
innocent and friendly relationship between the Canadian settlers and the Native populations), the
rooting of Canadian tolerance and pluralism in the colonial period, as an important part of
Canadian national identity. In addition, in the 19th century Canada began to view itself as one of
the colonized in contrast to the colonizing powers ( such as the United States), adding to its
identity of victimization and heritage of tolerance. The ''Canadian mosaic" model emerged in
opposition to the American melting pot. But the celebrated tolerance of the Canadian nation
coexisted with brutal exterminations and genocide during the period of settlement, and continues
to exist alongside racial discrimination and xenophobia. 92 Clearly, Canada's multiculturalism is
not a perfect model of inclusion and celebration of diversity, and Mackey agrees with Henry and
Tater than white Canadians can construct themselves as victims of multiculturalism, which leads
to the anti-immigrant feelings. But Mackey also argues that Canada's multiculturalist
nationalism, which sets up the Anglo-Canadian core as the unmarked dominant identity against
which everything else is "multicultural," also requires the presence of aboriginal and immigrant
Others. She writes that from the early years of settlement to World War II, white Anglophone
settlers in Canada "mobilised [sic] representations of others and managed non-British cultural
groups as part of the project to create a nation and a national identity." This was prior to the
official introduction of multiculturalism as a Canadian policy, but it demonstrates the important
use of the constructed Other in formulating a Canadian national identity, even before Canada
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itself was seen as pluralist instead of dualist. While other scholars, such as Henry and Tater,
have identified the unmarked Anglo whiteness that lies at the center of Canada's
multiculturalism, Mackey argues that the sometimes marginalized "Others" were and are central
• to Canadian nationhood and nationalism, while also managed internally in order to create a
hierarchy of difference around the dominant culture. 93
Mackey writes that the multiculturalist policy was introduced in response from the elites
of Canada to "a dangerous and ambiguous situation with regard to the cultural politics of
difference in post-war Canada." 94 The heightened movement for Quebec separatism and the
increased politicization of cultural minorities raised the feeling of need for a national policy and
identity that could manage and accommodate the extremely charged diversity of Canada. The
institutionalization of ·difference more or less accomplished this goal, while also making Canada
distinct from the United States. The state did not erase the difference it was attempting to
contend with, but rather manages and uses it. However, Mackey notes, "despite the proliferation
of cultural difference, the power to define, limit, and tolerate differences still lies in the hands of
the dominant group." The recent 1990s narratives of the Canadian nation highlight Canada's
cultural pluralism and locate it within a linear continuous narrative of Canada's past, present and
future. They utilize the mythology of the innocent, tolerant settlers and the resultant minority
populations of later immigration policies in order to reinforce the project of nation-building. 95

Canada's Official Languages
Looking at the United States, the debate over the "official" language is most relevant in
the context of immigration, as the influx of non-English speakers has caused the most
consternation and concern for those fearful of the future of the English language in America. In
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Canada, the situation is somewhat different. It is impossible to separate the subject of language
in Canada from the history of French-English relations, which is representative both of historical,
religious, and cultural differences as well as .linguistic ones. This ongoing tension in the
Canadian nation has been the source of academic and popular debate and has characterized both
the history of Canada and its struggles to form a national identity. In particular, the interplay
between bilingualism and multiculturalism as official policy demonstrates that the issue is just as
complicated in Canada as in the US, although some Americans have looked to Canada as a
demonstration both of the success and failure of pluralism.
With respect to language, English and French speakers have been embroiled over
national identity since the beginning. The contest over language coincides with the conflict
between Protestants and Catholics. This made decisions over which would be given official
status all the more consequential and contentious. After the French in Canada were conquered
by the English in 1759, 60,000 French were abandoned by France to English rule under the
Treaty of Paris in 1763.96 Under the Royal Proclamation of 1763, only English received official
language status, but the Quebec Act of 1774 established both English and French as official
languages, thereby superceding the 1763 act.
The struggles of their southern neighbors also influenced Canadian language and identity
politics, as American Independence led to increased numbers of American Loyalists fleeing to
Canada, which in turned caused increased calls for the assimilation of the Canadiens (the earlier
term used for French-speaking Canadians). 97 Simultaneously, the fear ofrebellion prompted by
the American Independence movement made the British colonial authorities hesitant to alienate
the French population. The Quebec Act, moreover, had granted Catholicism formal protection
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and extended civil laws to French speakers in order to gain their loyalty. The Constitutional Act
of 1791 confirmed the rights of the French to much of their way of life, but put the French
legislature of what was deemed Lower Canada (Quebec) under an English executive, while
making a separate and English Upper Canada (Ontario). Academics attribute the survival of the
French in Canada and their ability to resist assimilation to their language, religion, and defensive
nationalism. As it was, the other provinces besides Quebec did not grant language rights to
French speakers, and the French were excluded from the economic elite. 98
Lower and Upper Canada were reunited in 1840 under the Act of Union, and the
following few decades increased this need to present a united country against the advances of the
post-Civil War United States. The results of this defensive need for a united nation are visible
throughout Canada's history and in the way that they have identified their nationalism as unique
due to their particular blend of cultures. In addition, this historical development of nationalism is
also evident in the struggles over Canada's languages, as the British North America Act of 1867
officially recognized the bilingualism of Canada. However, the official recognition of more than
one language is not the end of the story, as will become overwhelmingly evident in my review of
Canadian history. Indeed, many of the current struggles center on what it means to be a bilingual
nation. In 1876, it meant that citizens had the right to use either tongue in the federal courts, but
not.the right to be educated in one's mother tongue. 99 Today it means the right to be educated in
one's mother tongue and use either in the courts and government, theoretically so that the
national leadership can communicate with Canadians in French and English. The reality,
though, is that the numbers of institutions where French and English-speaking Canadians work
together are decreasing, and French is less and less frequently a requirement in Canadian schools
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and universities. The bilingualism of Canada means the legitimizing of the two language groups,
which are largely separate. It is expected that French speakers, in the government as well as the
general population, will also speak English, but not vice versa. Bilingualism of individuals or
populations is not promoted. 100
Although today the French-English struggle is remarkable partly because of the
comparatively small percentage of French speakers, this was not always the case. Francophones
only became a minority in the mid-1800s, and in 1871, they were 31.1 % of the population, and
75% of the population of Quebec was French-speaking. These percentages were maintained
through the 1950s. In the 1930s and after, French Canada was in the process of changing from a
rural agrarian -society to an industrial one, and as many French Canadians moved to growing
cities, the existing family structure began to disintegrate. This resulted in a decreasing birthrate,
with a corresponding decline in native French speakers. In addition, the traditional French
Canadian nationalism during this time did not identify exclusively with Quebec. This was
because the antistatist Catholic elements in the French Canadian nationalism extended the
nationalism to all Catholic French Canadians, not only the ones who lived in Quebec. This
earlier nationalism changed in the mid to late 20 th century to become a strongly state-centered
nationalism, and the changing attitudes of the French with respect to the rest of Canada became
known as the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s. 101
The French language is perceived as increasingly endangered, as immigrants who enter
Canada are far more likely to learn English than French, contributing to the imbalance between
the two. The French population in Quebec became increasingly alienated from the rest of
Canada-this is also demonstrated in the term 'Quebecois' replacing the earlier term 'Canadien,'
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representing the movement away from attachment to the rest of Canada. The political movement
for Quebec's sovereignty gathered strength in the 1970s, which included attacks on the
legitimacy of the Canadian government. This prompted the need for a Canadian nationalism to
provide an alternative to the Quebec nationalist movement that was gathering strength, which
resulted in the Bilingualism and Biculturalism Commission, set up in 1963. There were a
number of changes to Canada's national symbols, including the flag and national anthem, in
order to prevent further alienation of the French population. 102 In 1969, English and French
became Canada's official languages under the Official Languages Act, but the conflict between
the Anglophone and Francophone populations did not diminish with this official recognition.
The Act itself prompted increased antagonism towards Francophones and the French language.
103

As Carol Schmid argues, the movement for Quebec's separation and resulting national
policies toward the province was extremely significant for the discussions about language and
ethnic policies in Canada after World War II. The B and B Commission (which, as evident in
the title, emphasized the two cultures in Canada, claiming it as bicultural, not multicultural)
made recommendations about Canada's language policies. It rejected a regional approach
defining language rights by geographic area (as in Switzerland) in favor of a policy applicable to
the nation as a whole. Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau, one of the architects of the
country's official multiculturalism, also subscribed to this principle, the goal of which was to put
French on an equal (not special) footing with English throughout Canada. His interpretation, and
the one which was implemented, in many ways interpreted Canada's dualism as one of
individuals, not collectivities, which has very different implications for the way that both bi- or
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multiculturalism and bilingualism are understood. It emphasizes the individual option to be able
to speak either English or French, but has no objective of national maintenance of the French
tongue, or designs for creating a better, less fraught, relationship between the two distinct
populations of Canada.104 This was an effort at a political solution that tried not to empower
separate ethnic groups or language communities to avoid giving either a "special" status. The
result was two very distinct cultural and linguistic groups that have the ability to protect
themselves against each other, but are seen as valuable in their separateness rather than their
collectivity. The policies implemented by Trudeau depend on group containment for
preservation-the idea that the languages are protected by their separation. This is a particular
definition and implementation of language maintenance, which has strongly influenced the
character of the Canadian nation.
As it is, there are still very few actual bilinguals in Canada, although it may tout itself as
a bilingual nation. According to census data, iri 1981 15.3% of Canadians could converse in
both French and English, and that number increased only to 16.3% by 1996. The onus to speak
both languages also falls disproportionately on the French-speakers rather than the Englishspeakers. The relations between Quebec and the rest of Canada also continue to be fraught.
There was a resurgence of Quebec nationalism in the late 1980s, caused by fears of assimilation
and by the cqntinued increase in immigration. The 1982 Constitution, which was passed without
the consent of Quebec, contained the Charter of Rights and Freedoms which framed language
rights in terms of individuals rather than the collectivities. This framing was at odds with the
territorial concept of language rights associated with Quebec nationalism. As Schmid argues,
"The appeal of Quebec sovereignty lies primarily in the affirmation of collective identity. The
growth in the support of sovereignty is linked to the failure of the Canadian political institutions
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over the last three decades to recognize and accommodate this identity."105 Trudeau's vision was
intended to offer some compromise, acknowledging the right of French-speakers to maintain
their own language and be able to use it in their own institutions and national ones. Originally
intended to decrease polarization by this acknowledgement of the distinct group of the French,
this policy ended up exacerbating the tensions between the two groups, even as it intended to
soothe them.
French and English continue to be the only officially recognized languages, and in 1997
the Legislative Advisory Group made a number of recommendations with respect to the
immigrant situation, the most contentious of which increased the importance of knowing one of
the two official languages for immigrants wishing to come to Canada. Some argued that the
policy was discriminatory against certain groups of immigrants (those not from English or
French-speaking nations), while others viewed the measure as one that would enable more
immigrants to get jobs in Canada. 106 Canada's history and·policy, however kind or harsh to
immigrants it may have been, was nearly always harsh toward their languages. Prior to the
1970s, all languages other than French or English had been discouraged by Canadian policy.
And as noted above, the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism did not imagine
Canada's plurality to be related to its immigrant populations or their languages. 107
The Multiculturalism Act of 1988 was something of a landmark, and a great number of
policies intended to acknowledge the varied cultural backgrounds of Canadian citizens have
benefited from it. The Act allowed for some funding for indigenous (First Nation) language
schools, but not for any other official recognition of non-English or French languages. 108 And
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even French has received much less official support than English. With the exception of
Quebec, the French language has, throughout Canada's history, gone without sufficient official
maintenance. When Canada's centennial approached in 1967, the population worried about the
discontent among Francophones and the country's ability to retain national unity for another
hundred years, leading to the creation of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and
Biculturalism in 1963, which, among other things, investigated the situation of language
inequality in Canada. 109
From Richard J. Joy's study of Canada's languages, we can see the extremely varied
landscape both of official and non-official language politics. Canada's non-official languages
encompass both the immigrant populations (from Europe, Asia, Africa, and many other nations)
and aboriginal, which includes both Canadian Indians and the Inuit. Not until 1991 did the
Canadian census ask about the presence of non-official languages, although it did ask about
'mother tongues.' Joy writes that, as of the late 20th century, some once-prominent non-official
languages (such as Yiddish and Gaelic) had nearly vanished, while others that were extremely
rare at the beginning of the 20th century-such as Greek, Portuguese, Spanish, and East Asian
languages-had flourished. 110 In addition, the influx of immigrants has also contributed in
different ways to the Anglophone-Francophone tension. Since the late 1980s, 3.7 million
immigrants claimed to speak either French or English. Of this number, 3.6% spoke only French,
12.7% spoke French and English, and 83.7% spoke only English. Thus, immigration to Canada
causes a decline in the proportion of French speakers. Only those immigrants who settle in
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Quebec get more exposed to French, so for Canadiens it is important to their linguistic survival
to attract more immigrants to French dominant areas. 111
Ronald Wardhaugh, writing in 1983, takes an extremely critical view of Canadian
language policies. In his view, they endanger national cohesion, having created fragmentation in
the past and are likely to exacerbate the problem in the future. Wardhaugh quotes Jawaharlal
Nehru about India and its language conflicts to support his point about the importance of
language for national feeling: "Some of the ablest men in the country came before us and
confidently and emphatically stated that language in the country stood for and represented
culture, race, history, individuality, and finally a sub-nation." 112 Wardhaugh notes that since
most Canadians do not live in bilingual or bicultural settings, and of those who do, their second
language and culture are more likely to be Chinese, Portuguese, Italian, or Greek rather than
English or French, the official policy is divisive, rather than cohesive. In his view, the
nationalism of both the French and the English cultural groups is what precludes the success of a
multicultural society; the two values of nationalism and multiculturalism are incompatible.
Contrary to the worried cries of many Canadian politicians and elites about the crisis of finding a
Canadian nationalism, Wardhaugh's perspective is that Canada is threatened more by
nationalism than by the lack of nationalism. In his argument, "Perhaps the only solution to
Canada's dilemma depends on developing a feeling of nationhood which does not rely on
language and ethnicity. " 113 In a way, Canadian politicians and Wardhaugh are speaking past
each other, because they have very different views of what is necessary for national survival.
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Canadian politicians are speaking of a singular Canadian nationalism, while Wardhaugh writes
about competing nationalism defined by ethnicity and language.
If asked whether a multicultural nationalism were possible, Wardhaugh would respond in
the negative. To him, the linguistic tension in the country, and the associated cultural group
feeling, precludes true multiculturalism or successful pluralism. Other scholars have argued
differently, and there has certainly been some effort, in Canada as well as other countries, to
embrace difference itself as a nationality: what we share is the ways in which we are all different.
Canada has made attempts to find a balance between sameness and difference within its borders.
According to Eva Mackey, it has done this by creating a flexible nationalism, one that can be
applied in different ways in different situations. The key facet is that it can emphasize difference
itself in different ways, choosing what difference to give emphasis to if any at all. In this, the
construction of multiculturalism is present, but inconsistent, in the country's nationalism. This
nationalism is also always framed within the idea of the bi cultural and bilingual country, and this
seems to have both added to and detracted from the power of the nationalism at different points.
In some ways bilingualism might seem to support the project of multiculturalism, being a solid,
non-monocultural basis upon which to expand on notions of pluralism in a given country. From
the United States's view point, this aspect of Canada might make it a prime location for testing
out multicultural nationalism. However, in the eyes of many Canadians, the "official
bilingualism" can contradict or come into conflict with "official multiculturalism." Bilingualism
as it has been implemented in Canada is representative of strong feelings about group rights, and
the smaller of these groups-the French-has survived in many ways through isolation. As
Schmid notes, "equal rights" for the French meant the right to be educated in separate schools,
not to have institutions that are, themselves, bilingual (in which children would choose which
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language to be taught in). And the project of official multiculturalism, because it has to be
situated within this pre-existing dichotomy (as non-French or English languages have never had
official recognition), is often seen as threatening the delicate balance between French and
English. 114 So, as much as "bilingual" and "multicultural" might seem like they should be
friendly concepts, the Canadian example displays that, when placed within the project of
nationalism, they are far from simple to implement together.
A final notable aspect of the language battles is that many Canadians past and present
have seen them as the driving force behind the instability of Canada's nation and nationalism.
Additionally, they can be seen as the testing ground for the possibilities of Canadian
multiculturalism. Canadian bilingualism may be official, but it is far from flawlessly
implemented, and the continued high levels of tension demonstrate that the policies as they exist
are not satisfactory for all involved. Further, this indicates a lot of doubt from within Canada
about the possibilities of Canadian multiculturalism. According to Graham Fraser, the Canadian
government has not made a (successful) effort to increase actual communication between the two
major linguistic groups. There are decreasing numbers of institutions in which French and
English speakers work together, and French is less and less frequently a requirement in Canadian
schools and universities. Additionally, it is expected that French speakers, in the government as
well as everyday citizens, will also speak English, but not vice versa. In his words, if Canada
fails to sustain a government that can communicate with its citizens in both French and English,
and maintain communication between them, "the other challenges may be insurmountable. " 115
The implication is that if bilingualism fails in Canada, it cannot maintain itself as a nation with a
cohesive national identity.
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Chapter 4
Nationalism, Immigration, and Language: The US and Canada in Comparison
Both the United States and Canada owed much of their early success as nations to their
immigration policies. As noted above, Higham argues that, in the early years of the American
territories, the American nationalists used their diverse population as evidence of their
uniqueness, their differentiation from Britain, and the basis for their national identity itself. 116
Canada had its own parent country-borne population, but it needed to fill expansive territories
and power the economy. For those in power at the time, the process of creating a national
identity required high numbers of immigrants, and so they were either tempted or forcibly
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shipped to Canadian shores. However, in both of these cases, the creation of a national identity
with respect to the origin of the population was not uncomplicated. As noted above, Canadian
policymakers in the 19th century did not intend for these population- and economy-boosters to be
a true part of the community they were trying to create. Canadian writers from 1909, cited by
Morton Weinfeld and Lori Wilkinson, worried about the perceived high nwnbers of immigrants
from "backward," non-Protestant countries of Southeast Europe. These immigrants were
considered a national danger and described as "dragging our civilization to a lower level. "117
This was exactly the argument of many contemporaneous restrictionists in the United States.
Early Americans were perfectly willing to utilize the idea of their unique diversity
(meaning, citizens from parts of Europe not restricted to England) in order to argue for an
independent nationality. They conceived of their national identity as something of a haven for
other exiles. However, while the settlers and immigrants originally from northeastern Europe
became "old stock" Americans, the populations from southeastern and western Europe, Asia and
116
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Africa were not so easily accepted as Americans. While Americans would also encourage the
importation or "immigration" of workers from China to build their railroads or, earlier, the
importation of African slaves, they did not consider these groups to actually be a part of the
nation that they built. Canada has many comparable experiences with its immigrants, down to
nearly parallel treatment of Chinese workers who came to build the railroads before having their
immigration restricted once the railroads were complete. Canada, like the US, utilized the
immigrant populations to fill certain economic and political needs, but simultaneously excluding
them from citizenship, thus making them outsiders to the nation they helped to build.
This dichotomy-between the purpose and function of the immigrants for the nation and
their place in the eyes of its citizens-seems to follow the history of immigration in both
countries. The United States has a long history of ambivalence toward its immigrants, and the
current movements against "illegals" as well as legal immigrants demonstrate that that feeling is
alive and well today. However, while some may call this an unwelcome "alien invasion," and
discuss the perils it represents for the nation's future, unity, collective identity, etc, in reality, this
influx of people looking for employment and willing to work for low pay and few benefits
(including those who, because of their illegal status, are easily exploited) is extremely beneficial
to influential interests in the United States: agriculture~ industry and service who employ such
workers and profit from it. 118
America responded to this crisis of national origins by fashioning its own unique brand of
nationalism. We can partly attribute the uniqueness and the success of American nationalism to
its ideological basis, which allowed for a significant amount of immigration without opposition
because it believed in its own powers of assimilation based on creed rather than blood. It came
up against its own limitations when immigrants who seemed too different entered the US,
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bringing to light the other facet of American nationalism: the racial aspect. This racial
nationalism, which identified the true America as purely white, could be hidden, disguised
behind the veneer of civic nationalism that made America open to all. It was the interplay
between the two strands of American nationalism that made America, the "nation of immigrants"
able to think of itself both as a nation that accepts foreigners but is not of those foreigners.
America responded to what could have been a crisis of nationalism: it was a completely new
kind· of nation, and it could not rely only on heredity definitions of nationhood and citizenship.
By the time of the American Revolution, there were already citizens from different countries in
Europe, not just one. America was not simply a British colony, but it also was not willing to
open the boundaries of its collective imagination to all of the populations within its borders. The
result of what could have been tension between the early pluralism in the population of America
and the need for a binding, unifying nationalism were these dual strands of nationalism: the civic
and the racial. The flexibility of civic and racial nationalism together was America's solution
and its response to the "multiculturalism" vs. "nationalism" problem. 119
The problems that confronted the early Canadian national project were somewhat
different from those in the United States. Always smaller, always less well established in the
American continent, Canada as a nation developed with an awareness of its deficiencies. The
need for a national character simply for the sake of being a nation was exacerbated by the need to
differentiate Canada from the United States. This need for national substance prompted the later
pluralism of the nation in the sense of the encouragement of immigrants to settle the country and
support its economy. Additionally, the pluralism could be called upon when necessary to
emphasize Canadian difference from the United States. In the earlier years, the French-English
biculturalism and the "Other" multiculturalism had distinct roles to play in the legitimization of
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Canada, although not always in the same ways. In the 20th century, in response to the cultural
politics of difference that arose in Canada after World War II, the pluralist nationalism came into
play as a measure by which the dominant group could define, limit, tolerate, and utilize that
difference. It was developed both to manage the diverse populations in Canada that were
becoming more and more vocal in their desires to be recognized as part of the nation, and also as
a nation-building project for Canada as a whole.
Much like the United States, the nation responded to the "crisis of pluralism" presented
by the act of trying to build a nation on a diverse population with varying degrees of power and
participation by formulating aflexible nationalism. Like the two strands of American
nationalism, Canada's pluralism could both acknowledge the amount of difference and still keep
some boundaries around the rights of the white founder-descendent population to manage it. In
the United States, this meant acknowledging difference when it could be managed by ideological
assimilation, but rejecting that the "different" groups from the racial nation. In the later decades
of the 20th century in the United States, when the reality of the racial nationalism came to light,
revealing America's unwillingness to truly accept nonwhite people as "American," this
combination began to fail. 120 In many ways, America is still currently struggling to redefine
itself. The struggle is perhaps less evident than it is in Canada, but it is there. Both countries
resorted to this flexible nationalism, but neither one has implemented it successfully.
Specifically, both the identification of Canada's nationalism as multicultural and the US's as
ideological (not acknowledging the racial dimension) hides an invisible, normalized whiteness at
the center, while regarding various races and ethnicities as residual. In Canada as well as the US,
there is significant animosity towards immigration and fear that it will disrupt the country's
national identity or security. In Canada this fear is also tied to worries about the delicate balance
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between the English and French-speaking populations, since immigrants are more likely to learn
English than French upon arriving in Canada. But both nations experience a fairly intense fear
of newcomers despite the fact that immigration has been a continued presence in recent years,
and is in some ways part of their national characters.
In both Canada and the United States, this struggle for self-definition is evident both in
the projects of national identity and in the related projects of language policy. Language is part
of the most fundamental experience of self and community, related to culture, ethnicity, family,
and nation. Consequently, the struggle to define where the many languages spoken by the
different populations in these two countries fit into the definitions of the nation is of course a
very controversial exercise. The interplay between language, nationalism, and immigration is
clearly evident in both countries, but the specific relationships between those factors differ
because of historical context. Still, we can learn a great deal by examining the way that these
two nations have attempted to integrate the notions of pluralism, biculturalism or
multiculturalism with the existing language politics. In America, this means attempting to figure
out how non-English languages can fit into a country that espouses pluralism and tolerance, but,
as a facet both of racial and of civic nationalism, does not accept the contribution of those
languages to America. In Canada, this means trying to give meaning to "multiculturalism" in a
tensely "bilingual" framework.
With respect to language policies, Canada and America contrast in their respective
relationships to the languages spoken within their borders. French has consistently enjoyed
much more prestige within Canada than any non-English language in the United States. Spanish,
for example, lacks the standing that French has in Canada. This means that the struggle to get
languages other than English recognized officially involves a different attitude towards those
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languages and what they mean for the nation. Canada has two competing identity models:
Anglo-Canadian multiculturalism and individual rights, and Quebec's focus on group rights. But
Schmid argues that Canada does not have core values like the US that hold the nation together
that are as strong as the competing sub-national cultural values. 121
As Schmid writes, the Canadian experience with the long-running tensions and
occasionally outright hostilities between Quebec and the rest of Canada is characterized very
strongly by group rights. These rights in turn have influenced policy implementation and the
experience of multiculturalism in Canada. In contrast, the American nation has always included
a deep devotion to individualism. As an example, Schmid notes the fascinatingly differe:pt
interpretations of duties to educate hon-English-speaking students in public schools: In Canada,
"equal rights" for these students means the right to be educated in "separate but equal" facilities
in French. Bilingual schools, in which students would get to choose which language to be
educated in, have been resisted. In the United States, this kind of separation harkens back to the
institutions that the civil rights movement fought so hard to abolish. Instead, bilingual education,
which is the subject of very considerable contention and is much decried by organizations like
US English, is most commonly seen as a transitory measure, meant to help non-English speakers
transition to the mainstream, as a way of removing their "disadvantage." As Schmid notes,
"Federal law and court precedent ... established the right of children in the United States to equal
educational opportunity-but that opportunity is essentially one within an Anglophone
society."122 Moreover, recently it has seemed that, for public schools dealing with high numbers
of immigrant students in the US, the solution is to separate them into a school-within-a-school,
until they can be integrating into "regular" classrooms.
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The relationship between language and nation is different in the two countries, and this is
to a certain extent evident in the way that they have framed their national projects. As Schmid
notes, "Lacking a unified culture, many Americans believe that English is one of the few values
that holds Americans together." This feeling, she notes, is intensified by immigration. And,
related to language acquisition, the dominant trend in the US is to see assimilation as a zero-sum
game: if something is gained, something else must be lost (i.e., the previous language and
culture). 123 The experience oflanguage itself in the history of the US is one of unification to
dominant English, just as Americans have always seen their ideology as a very important part of
• their sense of nationhood and citizenship. French language and cultural maintenance in Quebec
has no analog in the US. The non-English-speaking US populations are spread across the
country, and do not have the binding defensiveness of a defeated, then isolated, nation, or the
cultural cohesion to uniformity, that the French had in Canada. There, on the other hand, the
experience of language has been a divisive issue throughout history. Finally, there has never
been any official recognition of a language that is not English or French. In this sense, the
multiculturalist project of Canada stops in many ways at biculturalism.
In America, the English Only movement demonstrates some of the still-prevalent fears
about the influx of non-white immigration in some sense taking over the country. On the one
hand, the modem, primarily Third World derived, immigration and the languages that come with
it, come up against the racial nationalism that continues to identify America with whiteness. In
terms of language, this means a non-white-associated language (such as Spanish) confronting
English. But immigrants who come to America and continue to speak their native languages (or
seem to do so, even if the data does not support this conclusion) also clash with civic
nationalism, which asks that immigrants assimilate ideologically. While this was never specified
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in the Constitution, the evidence that the boundaries of civic nationalism can be traced along
English language only is evident in citizenship requirements, voting rights and procedures, and
our education system's reluctance toward bilingual education for any purpose other than a
transition to English. While nothing in law prevents bilingualism, and American values on
privacy respect the right to speak ethnic languages at home or in local communities, this
relegation of ethnic languages to a localized, "othered" private sphere speaks to the lower status
of those languages and the choice to speak them. According to many scholars, the dominant
feeling in America is that national unity, lacking other binding factors such as ethnic or religious
heritage, is dependent upon a common language. This is, in many ways, a rejection of the idea
of a multicultural nationalism, a country that can be bound together by their diversity rather than
their unity.
The different experiences of the language-related projects in these two nations can
provide insight into their differing conceptions of multiculturalism. As a term that is frequently
used, and far less frequently defined, it can be utilized in a myriad of ways, and there are what
we can identify as different kinds of multiculturalism. Canada has two official languages, which
the United States does not, but strong conflict between the two due to somewhat unequal
distribution. However, the languages of the immigrant communities are not given any official
status or recognition, and it seems like Canada would have less reason to deny recognition than
the United States would. Because the United States does not have the same kind of ethnic or
religious heritage as some older nations, many Americans attribute national unity to our
ideology, our language, and possibly to the connection between the two. Canada has an official
project of a national unity that is supposed to encompass two linguistic groups, but it does not
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reach out to try to encompass more, presumably for fear of weakening the national bonds or
destroying the balance between French and English Canada.
Ronald Wardhaugh, who I am sure is not alone in his thinking, argues that the United
States is not multicultural, while Canada is. 124 He feels that the United States and Canada
understand and manage the differences within their borders in distinct but very dissimilar ways.
I would frame the issue in another way, by distinguishing Canada's "hard" multiculturalism from
the more "soft" multiculturalism of the US, although the dichotomy is not quite that black and
white. Still, the "hard" vs. "soft" concept gets to the extremely contrary experiences of
difference in the two nations, of which language is one expression. Canada's "hard"
multiculturalism emphasizes group identity and membership, giving legitimacy to collective
claims and acknowledging collective contributions to the Canadian nation. At the same time,
there is an expectation of some degree of immigrant assimilation or "integration" into the
Canadian whole, from immigrant groups. The United States' "soft" multiculturalism emphasizes
the individual and individual rights, which gives a very different meaning to multiculturalism
than the Canadian version emphasizing firmly bounded groups. However, hard multiculturalism
has had a presence in the US as well, as some groups have argued for more multiculturalism of
contained groups rather than individuals. The Culture Wars of the 1960s were partly struggling
with this dichotomy, as policies like Affirmative Action attempt to give rights to groups,
something the US has generally rejected. That hard multiculturalism has had less success in the
American public discourse than the soft multiculturalism has had reflects American history and
ideology. The American view is conditioned by the realization that immigrants have changed
the US in positive ways, but the US' s historical emphasis on individuality has built up more
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discomfort than in Canada with the idea of firmly bounded and possibly separate cultural groups
with their own agendas and rules.
This discomfort in the US and in Canada also reflects some of the problems inherent in
the concept of multiculturalism and its function as a political movement. As Jack Eller notes,
multiculturalists advocate the maintenance of cultural groups in the US, partly as a method of
validating those cultures' contribution to the nation when it had been ignored in the past. This
political movement provoked a response from "anti-multiculturalists," who fear that this
emphasizing of group lines within the nation will cause fracture. They argue that the
"hyphenated American" concept indicates that racial or ethnic minorities are not, and should not
try to be, part of mainstream America. From both sides of the debate, culture becomes a weapon
in the war of identity politics. Multiculturalists can use it to legitimize groups, because groups
that have "culture" have something worth preserving and fighting for. Anti-multiculturalists can
argue for the existence of an American or Westem "culture" that multiculturalists seek to
divide. 125 Neither side is completely right, because both rely on the concept of a culture as
something that is more or less absolute, with rigid boundaries that can be patrolled. These two
political movements are actually prescriptive-they describe what they think cultural politics
ought to be than what they actually are, but under the pretense of reality. In reality, of course,
the boundaries of a cultural or ethnic group are fluid, and they change over time. Immigrant
groups have shaped diversity both in America and Canada, and they influence the ideals of
nationality, but immigrants and cultural or ethnic groups are also influenced by pressures for
uniformity from inside and outside of the group. 126 The kind of "multicultural" or "pluralistic"
nation that Canada and the US are attempting to maintain must contend with all of these
I
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complexities: cultural group identities that may shift with time, countrywide national unity, preexisting cultural, racial, or ethnic hierarchies, and the history of the nation.
America and Canada have both attempted to create unified nations around citizens of
very diverse backgrounds. Not only this, but they seek to tie citizens together both with a
present nationalism that acknowledges their diversity and a historical basis for acceptance of that
diversity. The "nation of immigrants" label demonstrates this, as it attempts to tie the current
state of immigration into a linear historical narrative in which all of the nation's citizens are
immigrants, all are outsiders, all are different. But as this thesis has shown, the situation is more
complicated than that. The US and Canada are both seeking to acknowledge the positive effects
that immigration and other politics of difference have had on their nations, and this is an
important part of maintaining the current levels of diversity without fostering resentment. But
the politics of cultural groups are extremely complicated, and drawing lines around the different
cultures will not solve the problem. In their attempts to contend with these extreme pressures
and politically charged issues, both the US and Canada have utilized the discourse of
multiculturalism, in various different forms, and developed flexible nationalisms to contend with
modern difficulties of national preservation. There are differences in the discourse related to the
specific interplay between multiculturalism and nationalism in each country, due to their
different histories and contexts in which those two factors are interpreted. But this prescriptive
discourse does not tell the whole story. The reality is a situation in which immigrants lose
language, and often much of the immigrant culture, by the third generation. This process of
deterioration of language skills particularly is well-documented. Assimilation and acculturation,
whether they are thought to be the solution or the problem, proceed relentlessly in both the US
and Canada, with the possible exception of the French Canadians. At the same time, what

69

immigrants are assimilating to has changed greatly over the years and centuries. Immigrants
have had undeniable effects on both countries. While the US and Canada might see themselves
as very different, the difference might rest more in the way that their laws express their national
imagination, and promote one kind of multiculturalism over the other. Because the Canadian
experience of institutionalized difference has been so deeply connected to the French-English
anxiety, their national imagination is tinged with the experience of group rights and inter-group
tension. But their reality of immigrant groups' entrance and transition into Canadian culture, and
Canadian culture's reaction to and absorption of its immigrants, may not be all that dissimilar
from the United States.
Chapter 5
Conclusion

The current age in which we, as citizens of the world, live, is one in which crossing
boundaries is a way of life. The modern world is replete boundary-crossing. Transnationalism,
mass immigration throughout the world, instantaneous communication and multiculturalism are
four of many indicators of permeable boundaries. This permeability challenges both the United
States and Canada to reconceptualize the "nation" in order to understand it. This task is made
more difficult given the historical grounding the two nations have in dealing with the difference
within their borders. The fact that this difference, this diversity, has been an established part of ·
each country's identity since its foundations seems not to have eased the path of managing
current difference. Although many scholars point to the label "nation of immigrants" and
discuss the pluralism of America and Canada in its founding years as evidence of a pre-existing
framework for managing the current levels of immigration without panic the reality is that the
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diversity of the founding years, in both countries, was managed with a strict hierarchy of
difference, not a true pluralism.
In the US, some newcomers were always more welcome than others, because some of the
different culture brought with the newcomers was more assimilable. The nation based a large
part of its identity on the ideals of equality and liberty for all as espoused by the founders, and
this identity facilitated much of the later immigration because it empowered the faith in the
assimilative powers of American ideology. But in the later half of the 20th century it became
increasingly evident that this equality and liberty could not be attained by all. The racial
hierarchy was masked by the egalitarian ideology for many years, but factors such as the nonwhite character of post-1965 immigration and the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s brought
the reality of American racial exclusion to the fore. In Canada, the values of multiculturalism
were retroactively assigned to the early years of the Canadian nation in order to establish a basis
for a current project of multiculturalism that would help to manage the unstable post-World War
II cultural-political scene. The country believed itself unique because it had a state-sanctioned
''balance" of different groups: the French and the English Canadians. But this bicultural
existence, which by itself was extremely fraught and had been since the beginning of the
country's history, was also not sufficient to deal with the immigrant groups in the nation. In
Canada's case, multiculturalism has had to contend with biculturalism, and one does not lead
into the other easily. As with the United States, some difference has been treated as better than
other difference, and the emphasis of the Canadian nationalism with respect to this difference has
shifted in time periods to celebrate and downplay parts of the difference when necessary to
maintain national unity.
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Many scholars, in noting the difficulties of modem nations in accepting difference and
maintaining cohesion simultaneously, have used different terms for the two competing values in
this struggle: "liberty" and "community," "equality" and "national unity." What these terms are
getting at is that Canada and the United States are both engaged in the ongoing struggle to
integrate nationalism with multiculturalism. Until they do, some citizens of their nations will
always be marked as outsiders, even as they are identified as "multicultural." In Canada and the
US particularly, we can also look to the struggles over language as an index of this battle over
multicultural and pluralistic identity in a national setting. In the case of the United States, many
American citizens believe that our common language is the only factor holding our incredibly
diverse country together, and so they demand that English be the only officially sanctioned
language and that all other immigrant languages be permanently replaced with English as those
immigrants come to the US. But if the United States is ever to be a multicultural nation, a nation
truly accepting of the difference within its borders, language, as an incredibly powerful
expression of identity, must be accommodated along with the other cultural aspects that can be
maintained in a truly pluralistic society. Some English Only advocates point to the tense
situation with Quebec as a potentially dangerous (meaning divisive) situation that could result
from state-sanctioned bilingualism. But this thesis shows that Quebec's tension with the rest of
Canada comes from multiple sources.
First, it comes from historical tensions between the French and English Canadians
compounded by their cultural and religious difference, which the US does not have an equivalent
for. Secondly, the tensions over language in Canada are, as noted by many critics of the current
language policies, caused in many ways by an implementation of the definition of 'bilingualism'
that keeps the two groups separate and fails to promote understanding and communication -
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between them. In addition, because Canada's interpretation of multiculturalism is necessarily
connected to their experience of bilingualism, it too is tied into the Canadian experience of this
linguistic group difference and the group-focused, "hard" multiculturalism they are more familiar
with, but which does not particularly emphasize communication or contact between groups in
order to strengthen the whole. Finally, because the Canadian experience of difference is so
bound up in their history of French-English relations, the project of multiculturalism identifies
other cultural groups as multicultural in relation to the founding populations, creating a similar
hierarchy of difference to the United States, in which certain racial and ethic groups are
marginalized or tokenized by their Otherness.
The issue of multiculturalism and nationalism is one which our modern age is forced to
contend with seriously if we wish to successfully maintain the pluralist nations we find ourselves
part of. The management of difference and unity requires us to contend with the ways in which
current issues have been addressed historically, rather than attempting to create foundations for
current multiculturalism by identifying the past as multicultural as well simply because it was not
homogeneous. We may be "nations of immigrants" now, but we weren't always, and that phrase
doesn't mean everything that we want it to mean. It does not mean that we know how to make
immigrant .groups part of the national character in a way that does not tokenize them. It does not
mean that we know exactly how to make our pluralistic nations cohere without depending on
exclusionary policies that maintain "unity" at the expense of those groups or individuals that we
consider too Other. Multiculturalism is not simply the coexistence of groups, but the
acknowledgement of all of their aspects of difference, the maintenance of that difference, and the
sharing of the experience of diversity. In Canada, this means fully committing to a policy of
multilingualism, in which the French Canadians are not the only bilinguals and the prominent
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immigrant languages such as Chinese are given equal standing in the national sphere. In the
United States, thi~ means acknowledging that we can be held together by our difference, not our
sameness, and that a country which is likely to be more than half Spanish-speaking sometime
within the current century needs to place Spanish on par with English. In both countries,
children should be able to learn two (or more) languages in public schools. As long as there are
some political or economic elite statuses that cannot be attained by certain groups because of
their linguistic or cultural identification, the societies are not truly pluralist or multicultural.

74

Sources Cited and Consulted
Baron, Dennis. The English-Only Question: An Official Language for Americans? New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1990.
Crawford, James. Ed. Language Loyalties: A Source Book on the Official English Controversy.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992.
Denis, Wilfred. "Language Policy in Canada." In Race and Ethnic Relations in Canada, ed.
Peter S. Li. Oxford: Oxford University Press Canada, 1999.
Edwards, John. Ed. Language in Canada. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1998.
Eller, Jack David. "Anti-Anti-Multiculturalism." American Anthropologist 99 (1997): 249-56.
Fishman, Joshua. Ed. Language Loyalty in the United States: The Maintenance and
Perpetuation ofNon-English Mother Tongues by Am-erican Ethnic and Religious Groups.
London: Mouton & Co, 1966.
Fishman, Joshua. "Planned Reinforcement of Language Maintenance in the United States:
Suggestions for the Conservation of a Neglected National Resource." In Language Loyalty in
the United States: The Maintenance and Perpetuation ofNon-English Mother Tongues by
American Ethnic and Religious Groups, edited by Joshua Fishman. London: Mouton & Co,
1966.
Fishman, Joshua. "Language Maintenance in a Supra-Ethnic Age: Summary and Conclusions."
In Language Loyalty in the United States: The Maintenance and Perpetuation ofNonEnglish Mother Tongues by American Ethnic and Religious Groups, edited by Joshua
Fishman. London: Mouton & Co, 1966.
Fraser, Graham. Sorry, I Don't Speak French: Confronting the Canadian Crisis That Won't Go
Away. Ontario: Douglas Gibson Books, 2006.
Gerstle, Gary. American Crucible: Race and Nation in the Twentieth Century. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2001.
Glazer, Nathan. We Are All Multiculturalists Now. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1997.
Glazer, Nathan. "The Process and Problems of Language-Maintenance: An Integrative
Review." In Language Loyalty in the United States: The Maintenance and Perpetuation of
Non-English Mother Tongues by American Ethnic and Religious Groups, edited by Joshua
Fishman. London: Mouton & Co, 1966.
Henry, Frances and Carol Tater. "State Policy and Practices as Racialized Discourse." In Race
and Ethnic Relations in Canada, edited by Peter S. Li. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Canada, 1999.
Higham, John. Send These To Me: Jews and Other Immigrants in Urban America. New York:
Atheneum, 197 5.
Higham, John. Strangers in the Land: Patterns ofAmerican Nativism 1860-1925. New York:
Atheneum, 1955.
Hing, Bill Ong. To Be An American: Cultural Pluralism and the Rhetoric ofAssimilation. New
York: New York University Press, 1997.
Honeyford, Ray. Integration or Disintegration?: Towards a Non-racist Society. London: The
Claridge Press, 1988.
Huntington, Samuel P. Who Are We?: The Challenges to America's National Identity. New
York: Simon and Schuster, 2004.
Imhoff, Gary and Richard D. Lamm. The Immigration Time Bomb: The Fragmenting of
America. New York: Truman Talley Books, 1985.

75

Isbister, John. The Immigration Debate: Remaking America. Connecticut: Kumarian Press,
1996.
Jacobson, Matthew Frye. Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the
Alchemy of Race. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998.
Kelley, Ninette and Michael Trebilcock. The Making of the Mosaic.: A History of Canadian
Immigration Policy. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998.
Kloss, Heinz. "German-American Language Maintenance Efforts." In Language Loyalty in the
United States: The Maintenance and Perpetuation ofNon-English Mother Tongues by
American Ethnic and Religious Groups, edited by Joshua Fishman. London: Mouton & Co,
1966.
Li, Peter S. "Race and Ethnicity." In Race and Ethnic Relations in Canada, ed. Peter S. Li.
Oxford: Oxford University Press Canada, 1999.
Li, Peter S. Destination Canada: Immigration Debates and Issues. Oxford: Oxford University
Press Canada, 2003.
Mackey, Eva. The House of Difference: Cultural Politics and National Identity In Canada.
London: Routledge, 1999.
Mann, Arthur. The One and the Many: Reflections on the American Identity. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1979.
Portes, Alejandro and Alex Stepick. City on the Edge: The Transformation ofMiami. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1993.
Portes, Alejandro and Ruben G. Rumbaut. Immigrant America: A Portrait Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1996.
Richard J. Joy. Canada's Official Languages/ The Progress of Bilingualism. Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1992.
Schildkraut, Deborah. Press One for English: Language Policy, Public Opinion, and American
Identity. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005.
Schmid, Carol. The Politics of Language: Conflict, Identity, and Cultural Pluralism in
Comparative Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
Schmidt, Ronald. Language Policy and Identity Politics in the United States. Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 2000.
Spickard, Paul. Almost All Aliens: Immigration, Race, and Colonialism in American History
and Identity. New York: Routledge, 2007.
Steinberg, Stephen. The Ethnic Myth: Race, Ethnicity, and Class in America. New York:
Atheneum, 1981.
Ujimoto, K. Victor. "Studies ofEthnicldentity, Ethnic Relations, and Citizenship." In Race
and Ethnic Relations in Canada, edited by Peter S. Li. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Canada, 1999.
Wardhaugh, Ronald. Language & Nationhood: The Canadian Experience. Vancouver: New
Star Books, 1983.
Webber, Jeremy. Reimagining Canada: Language, Culture, Community, and the Canadian
Constitution. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994.
Weinfeld, Morton and Lori A. Wilkinson. "Immigration, Diversity, and Minority
Communities." In Race and Ethnic Relations in Canada, edited by Peter S. Li. Oxford:
Oxford University Press Canada, 1999.

76

